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One of the leading arguments explaining the current rural conflict in Colombia is 
that it stems from deeply rooted peasant grievances over lack of land.   As is true in much 
of Latin America, Colombia has one of the highest levels of inequality of landownership 
in the world.   Yet in over four decades worth of land titling effort, INCORA, Colombia’s 
national land reform agency, has been unable to change the overall high concentration of 
landownership.   This thesis examines to what effect, if any, a redistributive land reform 
policy implemented amid the ongoing rural conflict would have on its resolution.    
While social scientists have developed a multitude of theoretical explanations of 
“why peasants rebel,” little attention has been given to how land reform implemented 
during intra-state conflict is to resolve peasant insurgencies.  Devoid of a theoretical 
framework, policymakers have looked towards two well-known cases of land reform in 
South Vietnam and El Salvador to base much of their decision making on the merits of 
land reform in the Colombian case.   Yet this thesis finds that these two cases do not 
provide sufficient evidence to suggest a similar failure of land reform in the Colombian 
case.   Furthermore, this thesis confirms that there is a strong historical nexus between 
land and conflict in Colombia, and since the mid-1990s, the intensification of the rural 
conflict resulted from: (1) the phenomena of “reverse land reform” where narco-
traffickers purchased vast sums of land attempting to launder illicit drug profits; (2) an 
increase in rural income inequality; and (3) a significant shift from illicit coca cultivation 
in Bolivia and Peru to Colombia.   
Ultimately, this thesis finds that as a “stand alone” policy, redistributive land 
reform will not only be a difficult agenda item for Colombia’s president to find political 
support for, but its very implementation will be violently contested by guerrillas, 
paramilitaries, and narco-traffickers.   This thesis concludes by offering potential 
alternative approaches or “paths” that make redistributive land reform feasible in 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
 A. DEFINING THE "COLOMBIAN QUESTION" 
Any scholarly study of Colombia quickly finds that this is a country of many 
paradoxes.  How can a country which is Latin America’s oldest "democracy” be also the 
world's largest producer and exporter of cocaine, have the world's highest murder and 
kidnap rates, and be continually at war with the longest surviving insurgency groups in 
Latin America?   These paradoxes compose the “Colombian Question.”   It is a question 
with neither easy solutions nor any apparent quick ending.    
Since the 1980s, the United States has perceived resolution of the first part of the 
"Colombian Question" as a crucial aspect in winning the U.S. domestic "War on Drugs."    
The socio-economic linkages between the United States and the Colombian illegal 
narcotics industry are enormous.    Almost ninety percent of all cocaine and forty percent 
of heroin smuggled illegally into the United States originate in Colombia.1    
Furthermore, estimates of the cost of illegal drugs on U.S. society are $160 billion 
annually.2   Consequently, over the past twenty years U.S. foreign policy towards 
Colombia has narrowly focused on counter-narcotics and the drug war.    By reducing the 
"Colombian Question" to one of "drugs and guns," U.S. policy has overlooked many of 
the country's socio-economic problems that arguably are at the core of Colombia's 
internal strife.   
B.    PLAN COLOMBIA AND THE EXPANSION OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 
In August 2002 U.S. legislators authorized portions of the $1.3 billion Plan 
Colombia aid to be used for both counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism efforts.  This 
represents a significant change in U.S.-Colombia foreign policy.  Current Colombia 
President Alvaro Uribe, who was elected on a "law and order" platform, has distanced his 
administration from the failed peace process of the previous Pastrana administration, by 
declaring an all out war on not only the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia Army 
 
1 U.S. President.  "National Drug Control Strategy," The White House (Feb. 2003) [Electronic 
version], available from http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/pdf/strategy2003.pdf  
(accessed 5 Mar 2003). 
2Ibid. 
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(FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN), but also the country's numerous 
paramilitary groups.3    Furthermore, the U.S. State Department officially classifies the 
18,000 strong FARC, the 3,500 - 5,000 strong ELN, and the 12,000 man paramilitary 
group, United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), as foreign terrorist organizations 
(FTOs).4   This has allowed an expansion of U.S. policy from counter-drugs to counter-
terrorism in Colombia.   In light of the U.S. “global war on terrorism” (GWOT), this 
latter effort is becoming an increasingly important factor in shaping current U.S.-
Colombia foreign policy.  
 Further evidence of the expansion of U.S.-Colombian policy is seen by the Bush 
Administration's 2004 budget request for an additional $147 million to train Colombia's 
military to protect the vulnerable Cano Limon-Covenas oil pipeline in the northeastern 
province of Arauca.  This 500-mile, 100,000-barrel a day pipeline, jointly operated by the 
state oil company Ecopetrol, and U.S. owned Occidental Petroleum, is a frequent target 
of both the ELN and FARC.5   The expansion of U.S. policy from counter-narcotics to 
counter-terrorism represents a potential 'crossing-over' point in America's involvement, 
where U.S. civilians and personnel are perceived as belligerents in the eyes of Colombia's 
FTOs.6      
 
3 Both human rights organizations and U.S. legislators have been critical of the existence of the 
relationship between the paramilitaries and the Colombian military.   Some Colombians have even gone so 
far to refer to the paramilitaries as the "Sixth Division."   The phrase originates out of the common belief 
that the "paras" are so ingrained into the Colombian Army's strategic, command, logistical and intelligence 
infrastructures, that they make up the Army's Sixth Division (Colombian Army is officially organized into 
five divisions).   However, since President Uribe's election to office, he has done much to sever this 
perception by declaring both the guerrillas and paramilitaries as terrorist organizations, and prosecuting 
both organizations as such.  See Human Rights Watch.  "The Six Division: Military and Paramilitary Ties 
and U.S. Policy in Colombia."  [Electronic version] (Human Rights Watch: New York, September 2001) 
available from http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/colombia/6theng.pdf  (accessed 10 Jan 2003). 
4 Sweig, Julia E.  "What Kind of War for Colombia?"  Foreign Affairs (Sept/Oct 2002), available from 
http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/fa/fa_septoct02j.html, (accessed 01 Jan 2003). 
5 Dauenhauer, Katrin.  “Politics-U.S.: Increase Sought for Pipeline Protection Program.”  Global 
Information Network (July 02, 2003) www.proquest.umi.com [30 Sep 03].   The pipeline continues to be a 
“strategic target” for the ELN.  Since 1986 the guerillas have attacked the pipeline 700 times.  From an 
environmental assessment, these attacks have resulted in oil spills of 2.2 million barrels.   
      6 Villelabeitia, Ibon.  "Colombian Rebels Say Americans "Prisoners of War."   The Washington Post, 
25 February 2003,[Home page on-line] www.washingtonpost.com (accessed on 1 Mar 2003).   On 13 
February 2003, FARC-EP captured three U.S. contractors conducting narcotics aerial surveillance after 
their plane crashed in southern Colombia.  FARC-EP claims that these three U.S. citizens are now 
"prisoners of war" and will only be released in a larger prisoner exchange with the Colombian government.  
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An analysis of U.S. support of Plan Colombia shows U.S. policy is 'banking' 
heavily on the use of military aid to strengthen the Colombian State.   From 1997-2003 
the United States supported approximately $2.92 billion in aid to Colombia.7   Of this 
only 17% or approximately $4.96 million went towards aid for judicial reform, 
alternative crop development, human rights projects, and relief to displaced persons.8   
The disparity between Plan Colombia’s military versus socio-economic aid stems from 
the plan’s failure to gain widespread international support, specifically from the European 
Union (EU).9    
The overwhelming perception from both Europe and the United Nations is that 
the only long-term solution to Colombia’s conflict is through significant socio-economic 
reforms.  In January 2001 the European Parliament announced it would support the peace 
process in Colombia, but not Plan Colombia due to: (1) the plan's failure to address the 
economic and social aspect of the Colombian conflict; (2) the perceived belief that 
defoliants used in illicit crop eradication was not only harmful to the environment, but 
was partially responsible for causing the forced displacement of thousands of peasants; 
(3) the perception that the Colombian government was not doing enough to combat 
paramilitary groups; (4) the plan’s heavy emphasis on the use of military force as a 
solution for lasting peace; and (5) the plan did not address a "genuine agrarian reform" to 
bring about a fundamental change in the unequal "concentration of land."10   The 
overwhelming consensus from the EU’s member states was that they were not going to 
pay the bill of a war, "they did not perpetuate, did not expand, and did not make 
 
7 Isacson, Adam and Ingrid Vaicius.  "The 'War on Drugs' meets the "War on Terror."  International 
Policy Report 6, (Feb 2002) [Electronic version], http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/0302ipr.pdf (accessed 
20 Feb 2003). 
8 Ibid  
9 President Pastrana originally proposed Plan Colombia to the United States in April 2000.  As 
presented Plan Colombia’s original intent required a financial price tag of $7.5 billion.   Of that amount, $4 
billion would come from Colombia, whereas the additional $3.5 billion was to come from the international 
community, namely the United States and the European Union.     See European Union. External Relation. 
“Colombia: An international commitment to peace.” (April 30, 2001) [Home page on-line]; available from 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/news/patten/speech_01_192.htm  (accessed on 04 Oct 2003). 
10 European Union. External Relation. "European Parliament Resolution on Plan Colombia and 
Support for the Peace Process in Colombia." ( 02 February 2001) [Home page on-line]; available from  
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/colombia/doc/ep01_02_01.htm  (accessed on 11 Mar 2003).   
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worse.”11   Ultimately, on April 30, 2001, EU External Commissioner Chris Patten 
announced a $330 million European aid package for Colombia, most of which was to go 
directly to non-governmental organizations (NGOs) vice the government of Colombia.   
Of this amount only a mere $140 million would come from the EU, with the remaining 
amount financed by the Spanish government.12   The announcement was a significant 
blow to former-President Pastrana’s original vision of Plan Colombia and the former 
Clinton administration that “sold” Plan Colombia to Congress with the critical 
assumption that U.S. support of the plan was just one part of a comprehensive 
international effort in Colombia.   
In light of the limited international support for Plan Colombia, what has evolved 
is an official U.S.-Colombia foreign policy that aims to: (1) strengthen Colombia’s 
democratic institutions; (2) promote respect for human rights and the rule of law; (3) 
intensify counter-narcotics efforts; (4) foster socio-economic development; (5) address 
immediate humanitarian needs; and (6) end the threats to democracy posed by narcotics 
trafficking and terrorism.13  However, the counter-drug mission and the newer counter-
terrorism mission receive the bulk of U.S. efforts both financially and militarily.   
Whether characterizing Colombia’s armed non-state actors as FTOs, insurgents, or 
‘narco-terrorist’, the underlying strategy that dates from the Clinton administration is to:  
(1) cut off the FTOs financial resources derived from coca through eradication and 
interdiction; and (2) provide the state with military assistance and training to gain the 
 
11 Roy, 21. 
12 “Colombia: An international commitment to peace.” (European Union External Relations: Brussels, 
30 Apr 2001), www.europa.eu.int/comm/external relations/news/patten/speech 01 192.htm [01Jun 03]. 










                                                
‘upper-hand’ by defeating the FTOs (namely FARC-EP and the ELN) on the 
battlefield.14   This strategy acknowledges what many Colombian officials and military 
leaders have long been advocating that without first addressing Colombia’s internal 
security threats any gains against coca cultivation and narcotrafficking will be negligible.  
 However, this strategy has not come without its critics.   In June 2003, the U.S. 
General Accounting Office (GAO) concluded that in the three years following the 
initiation of U.S. support for Plan Colombia, the U.S. Departments of State and Defense, 
“Have still not developed estimates of future program cost, identified a proposed end 
state, or determined how they plan to achieve it.”15  This gives rise to a fundamental 
question of U.S policy in Colombia, “Is current U.S. policy defective in that it fails to 
also address more deeply rooted socio-economic reforms whose resolution may be just as 
essential as a possible military solution to the conflict?”      
C.    THESIS PURPOSE       
One of the leading arguments explaining the current rural conflict in Colombia is 
that it stems from deeply rooted peasant grievances over lack of land tenure.   Like much 
of Latin America, Colombia has one of the highest levels of inequality of landownership 
in the world.   Current estimates of the extremely high concentration of landownership in 
Colombia state that approximately 3% of all landowners own almost 70% of all arable 
land.16   Yet in over four decades worth of land titling efforts, Colombia’s national land 
reform agency, INCORA, was unable to change the overall inequality in landownership.   
 
14 United States.  Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control. Colombia: Counterinsurgency vs. 
Counter-narcotics. 108th Congress: Washington, D.C.  (Sep. 21, 1999) 
http://drugcaucus.senate.gov/colombia99wilhelm.html [09 Sep 03].    The U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency 
(DEA) defines a narco-terrorist organization as,  “An organized group that is complicit in the activities of 
drug trafficking in order to further, or fund, premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against 
noncombatant targets with the intention to influence (that is, influence a government or group of people).”  
Clearly by this definition Colombia’s three largest non-state armed actors meet this criteria.   Source:  U.S. 
Drug Enforcement Administration.   “Drugs and Terrorism a New Perspective.”   DEA Drug Intelligence 
Brief (September 2002) [Report on-line] available from 
http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/intel/02039/02039.html (accessed on 1 Nov 2003). 
15 U.S. Government Accounting Office (GAO). “Drug Control Specific Measures and Long-term Cost 
for U.S. Programs in Colombia have not been developed.”   (June 2003) [Electronic version] available from 
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-783  (accessed on 25 Jul 2003). 
16 The Global IDP Project of the Norwegian Refugee Council.  Available from 
<http://www.db.idpproject.org/sites/ IdpprojectDb/idpSurvey.nsf> (accessed on 08 Dec 2002). 
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This thesis examines to what effect, if any, a redistributive land reform policy 
implemented amid the ongoing rural conflict would have on its resolution.       
While institutional and administrative failures within INCORA played a role in 
the overall inadequacy of land reform policy in Colombia, previous failed attempts at 
land reform have traditionally suffered from:  (1) lack of political will among Colombia’s 
presidents; (2) a legislative branch that remains highly ‘clientilistic’ and difficult for 
president’s to build policy consensus; (3) effective anti-land reform lobbying by 
agriculture producer groups; and (4) the lack of nationally organized peasant groups to 
exert political pressure on the government (with the exception of the national peasant 
organization, Asociacion Nacional de Usuarios Campesinos or  ANUC, during the late 
1970s).     
The historical inability of the state to resolve the land issue in Colombia was 
greatly exacerbated by developments during the 1980s and 1990s.   During the 1980s, 
much of Colombia's rural land was purchased in vast amounts (an estimated one million 
hectares) by narco-traffickers who were using land to launder illegal drug money.17   
Remarkably, this phenomenon of "reverse-land reform" exceeded the amount of land 
redistributed to Colombia's landless peasants in 25 years of land reform efforts by 
INCORA, the state land reform agency.18    Furthermore, failed market reforms during 
the early 1990s had the unintended effect of undermining Colombia’s agricultural sector 
and dramatically increasing both rural inequality of income and inequality of 
landownership.19    
The spark that escalated the rural violence in the 1990s came after a dramatic shift 
of coca cultivation in Colombia following successful eradication and interdiction efforts 
in neighboring Bolivia and Peru.   With little or no state presence in much of rural 
Colombia, a deadly "turf war" ensued between guerrillas, paramilitaries, and narco-
 
17 "Colombia Survey: The Curse of the Vigilantes." The Economist, Vol 359, Issue 8219 (21 April 
2001) available from http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb  (accessed on 15 Feb 2003). 
18 Ibid. 
19 “Colombia:  Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix.”   IMF Country Report No. 01/68 (30 April 
2001)[Electronic copy] available from http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2001/cr0168.pdf  (accessed 
on 3 Apr 2003). 
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traffickers over coca fields and the peasants who worked in its cultivation or production 
(Figure 1).   The lack of rural insecurity also forced many peasants to leave their lands, 
becoming one of the over two million internally displaced persons (IDP) in Colombia 
since 1985.20   This adds to the already poor Colombian quality of life in which 8.3 
million Colombians live in absolute poverty.21          
D.   RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
As stated, this thesis strives to determine to what affect land reform would have 
on resolution of the Colombia's rural conflict.  In order to answer this central question of 
the thesis, other sub-research questions will be:  
1. According to the leading theoretical explanations for why peasants revolt, 
what role can land reform play in resolving rural-based insurgencies?   
2. What does the experience of other countries teach about the feasibility of 
carrying out land reform during intra-state conflict? 
3. What are the historical roots of Colombia's rural conflict? How did this 
conflict change after the "coca boom" of the 1980s and the subsequent 
"coca explosion" of the mid-1990s? 
4. What is the feasibility of implementing a redistributive land reform in 
Colombia amid the current political conditions?  What actors would 
oppose or support a redistributive land reform policy?  And how does 
expropriate land reform via asset forfeiture change these actor's policy 
preferences?  
E. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis will rely on both primary and secondary source material.  Primary 
source material includes both U.S. and Colombia government documents, which discuss 
land reform, foreign aid, the insurgent threat, and narco-trafficking.   Secondary sources 
will provide both the leading scholarship on peasant revolution and rebellion, and will 
provide the historical backdrop to land conflict in Colombia and in other historical cases. 
 
20 Ibid. 
21 World Food Program. "Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation Colombia 6139.00: Assistance to 
Persons displaced by Violence in Colombia."  (World Food Bank:  Rome, 22 Oct 1999), 1. 
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 In order to establish a theoretical framework for the feasibility of land reform 
during conflict, a case study methodology will be used to analyze land reform cases in 
South Vietnam and El Salvador.   Finally, land reform's feasibility in the current 
Colombian conflict will draw upon a political economy methodology and analyze the 
policy preferences of the pertinent actors amid their own institutional settings.   
F. CHAPTER ORGANIZATION 
Chapter II presents the leading relevant theoretical literature that concentrates on 
the underlying causes of peasant revolt or mobilization.   While the "land reform 
hypothesis" is prevalent in the literature, other competing and contradictory approaches 
may have equal validity in the Colombian case.   As no one theory addresses the pivotal 
research question of land reform’s implementation amid conflict, Chapter II examines the 
important and historical cases of land reform in South Vietnam and El Salvador.   This 
chapter argues that although land reform failed to win the political will of the peasants in 
these two cases, their conclusions do not predict that redistributive land reform in 
Colombia will have the same effect. 
Chapter III provides a historical analysis of land and conflict in Colombia.  This 
chapter examines the prevailing argument that today’s rural conflict is “deeply rooted.”   
This chapter analyzes land and conflict in Colombia over three distinct evolutionary 
phases beginning in the late 19th century and ending in the contemporary conflict.   This 
chapter also gives specific attention to three variables that may have had particular 
significance in increasing rural violence beginning in the mid-1990s: the phenomena of 
“reverse land reform;” inequality in landownership; and inequality of income.  
Chapter IV examines the feasibility of a redistributive land reform policy under 
the current political and economic conditions in Colombia.   Concentrating on the role of 
Colombia's president, congress, agricultural interest groups, guerrillas, and paramilitaries, 
this chapter shows that those who would oppose land reform in Colombia significantly 
outweigh those who would support it.    Yet this chapter also examines Colombia's recent 
asset forfeiture laws, which may provide the only realistic opportunity for redistributive 
land reform in Colombia.  
 9 
Building on the previous chapter’s findings that a redistributive land reform 
would most likely lead to an increase in rural violence, Chapter V provides several 
different approaches that address the specific challenges to redistributive land reform in 






















Figure 1:  The Battle for Colombia22
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22 This map depicts the former 17,000 square mile demilitarized zone created by former President 
Pastrana on November 6, 1998, as an act of goodwill in opening negotiations between the government and 
FARC-EP.   President Pastrana was strongly criticized within Colombia for the zones creation, as many 
believed that it merely created a 'safe-haven' for FARC-EP to operate, train, and replenish their forces.  
Ultimately, as peace negotiations broke down, a frustrated President Pastrana ordered the military to retake 
the zone on January 9, 2002.  Map by Philippe Rekacewicz, "Guerrillas and paramilitary forces in 





 Figure 2:  Coca and Poppy Cultivation Regions of Colombia (2001-2002) 
 
Source: “Drug Control Specific Measures and Long-term Cost for U.S. Programs in 
 Colombia have not been developed.”  Government Accounting Office:  Washington, D.C., (June 
 2003), [electronic version] www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-783 (accessed on 25 Jul 2003]. 
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II. LAND REFORM AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
The role of the countryside is variable:  it is either the source of stability 
or the source of revolution.  For the political system, opposition within the 
city is disturbing but not lethal.  Opposition within the countryside, 
however, is fatal.  He who controls the countryside controls the country.1
—Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (1968) 
 
A. LAND REFORM AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION: AN OVERVIEW 
This thesis ultimately seeks to determine what role if any a significant and wide-
reaching land reform policy will have in resolving Colombia's persistent rural conflict.   
Those who propose land reform as a “prescription” for rural insurgency argue, “The greater 
the misdistribution of land, the greater the probability of mass-based political insurgency.”2  
The “land reform hypothesis” further stipulates that until land reform is adequately 
implemented, insurgency will persist and perhaps even lead to the overthrow of the state.3   
In the aftermath of the Second World War, no other nation embraced and advocated the 
merits of land reform more than the United States.    In the broader national security 
strategy of “containment,” U.S. policymakers frequently used land reform as a foreign 
policy instrument to counter the potential Communist exploitation and mobilization of 
“peasant discontent,” particularly in East Asia.4   Consequently, the United States would 
become the leading force behind land reform in post-war Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.  
The subsequent “success story” of the modernization and eventual democratization of these 
three countries has been attributed to these initial land reform policies.     
While land reform became the policy de jour in East Asia, it was not so eagerly 
embraced by the United States for Latin America, at least initially.   In 1954, the 
 
1 Huntington, Samuel P.  Political Order in Changing Societies.  ( Yale University Press:  New Haven, 
1968), 292. 
2 Muller, Edward N. and Mitchell A. Seligson.  “Inequality and Insurgency.” [Electronic version] 
American Political Science Review, 81.2, (June 1987),  425. 
3  Goodwin, Jeff.  No Other Way Out:  States and Revolutionary Movements, 1945-1991.  (Cambridge 
University Press:  Cambridge, UK, 2001), 229.   
4 Louis J. Walinsky, ed.  The Selected Papers of Wolf Ladejinsky:  Agrarian Reform as Unfinished 
Business.  (Oxford University Press:  Oxford, 1977), 287.   
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Eisenhower administration covertly supported the overthrow of Guatemala's democratically 
elected President Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán, who had earned the opposition of both 
Guatemala's powerful landed oligarchy and the U.S. owned United Fruit Company, by 
implementing an aggressive land reform policy.   However, the successful Cuban 
revolution of 1958 would cause the United States to reevaluate land reform’s applicability 
for Latin America.  Consequently, land reform would become a cornerstone of the United 
States led Latin American development plan called the Alliance for Progress (1961-1968).   
Halfway around the globe U.S. involvement in South Vietnam brought in a new era 
of U.S. foreign policy and land reform.   In this case, U.S. policymakers advocated land 
reform not to prevent intra-state conflict but to resolve intra-state conflict.   While the 
Vietnamese conflict was largely perceived as a traditional “East-West” struggle, many, 
including successive U.S. presidents, also saw much of the conflict’s origins in Vietnam’s 
significant socio-economic underdevelopment and inequality.  Consequently, U.S. 
policymakers, albeit indecisively at times, would turn to land reform as an important 
element in South Vietnam’s rural pacification strategy.    Unfortunately, by the time land 
reform did finally reach a measure of success late in the war (1970-73), the conflict's 
outcome had become a fait accompli.    
Less than a decade later, faced with an escalating Communist supported insurgency 
in El Salvador, the United States would once again unsuccessfully advocate land reform as 
a means of conflict resolution.    Based on these less than stellar results in both South 
Vietnam and El Salvador, some scholars have refuted the land reform hypothesis stating, 
“One is hard pressed to cite any instance in which agrarian reform implemented amid an 
ongoing civil war has effectively dissipated that conflict.”5    Although this conclusion, 
which is based largely on the two above cases, cannot be presented as a land reform theory 
per se, it does present a significant obstacle for those proposing land reform as a means of 
conflict resolution in Colombia.      
The first part of this chapter presents an overview of the leading social science 
theories that have tried to answer the pivotal question of why peasants rebel or revolt 
 
5 Mason, T. David.  "Take two acres and call me in the Morning": Is Land Reform a Prescription for 
Peasant Unrest?" [Electronic version] The Journal of Politics, 60.1 (Feb., 1998), 199. 
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specifically concentrating on theories of peasant discontent and theories of inequality, 
which may have particular relevance in the Colombian case.   Implicit or explicit in these 
theories is the belief that land reform is important for preventing rural-based guerrilla 
conflict.  The second part of this chapter analyzes the two cases of land reform that provide 
many with strong evidence that land reform will not work in countries where conflict is 
already underway: South Vietnam (1958-1961, 1970-1973) and El Salvador (1980-1991).    
As this chapter illustrates, in the South Vietnamese case once the country's elites were 
willing to concede to a truly redistributive land reform policy late in the war, it was "too 
little, too late" to make any difference in the war's outcome.  In the Salvadoran case, not 
only was land reform policy fatally flawed in that it did not address the critical landless 
peasant issue, but also an increase in security force and state-sponsored repression (i.e. 
death squads) undermined any positive effects of land reform driving many peasants into 
the insurgency movement.   Finally, this chapter's conclusion argues that the two 
commonly cited cases of South Vietnam and El Salvador do not provide enough evidence 
to disprove the applicability of the "land reform hypothesis" in the Colombian case.  
B. THEORIES OF PEASANT REVOLT: AN OVERVIEW 
Until the mid-1960s there was little emphasis in social-science scholarship 
dedicated towards understanding the phenomenon of peasant revolt or rebellion.    Yet 
the undeniably large number of peasant based revolutionary movements in the Cold War 
era, especially U.S. involvement against a rural based insurgency in South Vietnam, 
provided the impetus for an entire generation of scholars to attempt to explain the 
fundamental question of what makes peasants revolt.   Out of this scholarship, theories of 
insurgency or rural violence have tended to focus on the following three items:  (1) what 
kinds of grievances (e.g., inequality of landownership, inequality of income, "crisis of 
subsistence") are significant enough to motivate peasants to engage in collective action? 
(2) Under what conditions do peasants have the resources (e.g., material, leadership) to 
engage in collective action?  And (3) when does collective action take a violent form?   
Yet as this section illustrates, while there are numerous theoretical explanations to 
provide explanation for peasant revolt or mobilization, the reality of rural conflict is 
difficult to explain as a single phenomena.   In the final part of this section, I discuss 
Timothy Wickham-Crowley’s excellent theory of “peasant support” which is a multi-
 16 
                                                
variable approach.    In the Colombian case, it is exactly this “peasant support” which I 
will argue in Chapter III that forms the pivotal “center of gravity” in the rural conflict.   
1. Land Inequality and Rural Violence   
The belief that inequality in a society can lead to political violence is well 
established in political theory as evidenced by Aristotle’s writings in A Treatise on 
Government:  
That cause which of all others most universally inclines men to desire to 
bring about a change in government is that which I have already 
mentioned; for those who aim at equality will be ever ready for sedition, if 
they see those whom they esteem their equals possess more than they do.6   
Yet applying the inequality hypothesis to inequality of land as a source of political 
violence has proven to be more challenging than Aristotle's original thesis.   In an attempt 
to validate the relationship between inequality of land and political instability within a 
democratic framework, Bruce Russett (1964) argued: 
The combination of inequality and a high rate of tenancy would cause 
instability. While neither by itself would necessarily lead to violence or 
frequent change of government, the combination almost inevitably 
would…it is highly unlikely that a nation with a grossly unequal pattern of 
distribution of a major source of wealth, like agricultural land will have a 
consistently democratic government.7
In his conclusions, Russett found that only 3 of 23 states with unequal land distribution 
(based on their Gini Co-efficient) were considered “stable democracies.”8   The 
remaining countries, including Colombia, were found to be “unstable” democracies. 
As the number of rural based insurgencies intensified in much of the third world, 
specifically South Vietnam, many, including Samuel Huntington in his pivotal work  
 
 
6 Aristotle.  A Treatise on Government:  Book V, Ch. II. trans. and ed. William Ellis (J.M. Dent and 
Sons: New York, 1912) [On-line version] available from http://aristotle.thefreelibrary.com/A-Treatise-on-
Government/0-1 (accessed on 25 Nov 2003).   
7 Russett, Bruce M.  “Inequality and Instability: The relation of land tenure to politics.”  [Electronic 
version]  World Politics, 16.3, (Apr., 1964), 453. 
8 Ibid. 
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Political Order in Changing Societies (1968), attempted to put the inequality of land 
argument into the context of revolution “from below.”  In his version of the “land reform 
hypothesis,” Huntington states:  
Where the conditions of land-ownership are equitable and provide a viable 
living for the peasant, revolution is unlikely. Where they are 
inequitable…revolution is inevitable, unless the government takes prompt 
measures to remedy these conditions.9  
Edward Muller and Mitchell Seligson (1987) modified Huntington’s “land reform 
hypothesis” by proposing that land inequality would not make revolution “inevitable” per 
se, but rather greatly increased a state’s “vulnerability” to revolution “from below.”10  In 
their study of 85 states, they concluded, “Agrarian inequality is relevant only to the extent 
that it is associated with inequality in the nationwide distribution of income…land reform 
without income redistribution is probably at best merely a temporary palliative.”11  More 
recently, Moore, Lindstrom, and O’Regan (1996) added to the debate by arguing that 
neither inequality in landownership, nor income has any relationship in determining 
political violence, as over time inequality is a stable and almost fixed factor compared to 
the fluid levels of political violence.12    While there is clearly no consensus on the land 
inequality hypothesis, others have taken different approaches and have placed the 
peasant, not land at the center of the argument. 
 2. Is There a Certain "Type" of Peasant That is Most Likely to Rebel? 
 In Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century (1969) Eric Wolf proposes that peasant 
revolts are defensive in nature, and emerge where peasants choose to preserve "traditional 
lifestyles" against the forces of modernization.13   Central to his argument is his concept 
of “tactical control.”   Only a peasantry that is "in possession of some tactical control 
 
9 Huntington, 375.   
10 Muller and Seligson, 425. 
11 Muller and Seligson, 443.   
12 Moore, Will H., Ronniee Lindstrom, and Valerie O’Regan.  “Land Reform, Political Violence and 
the Economic Inequality-Political Conflict Nexus: A Longitudinal Analysis.”  International Interactions, 
Vol. 21, 1996. In T. David Mason. “Take Two Acres And Call Me In The Morning”: Is Land Reform A 
Prescription For Peasant Unrest?  [Electronic version] The Journal of Politics, 60.1, (Feb., 1998), 200.  
13 Goldstone, Jack A. ed.  Revolutions:  Theoretical, Comparative, and Historical Studies.  (Harcourt 
Brace College Publishers:  Fort Worth, 1994), 58. 
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over its own resources, can provide a secure basis for ongoing political leverage."14   
Wolf argues that "poor peasants" or "landless peasants" are without tactical control and 
are unlikely candidates to revolt without the existence of "some external power to 
challenge the power that constrains them."15   Similarly, "rich peasants" are not likely to 
revolt due to their relationship with "power holders outside the village."16   Only two 
groups have sufficient "internal leverage to enter sustained rebellion": the landowning 
"middle peasantry;" and those peasants living in the "peripheral.”17   Although 
"peripheral peasants" may not have sufficient land even for subsistence, other activities 
such as "smuggling" can "supplement land in sufficient quantity to grant the peasantry 
some latitude of movement."18   Those colonos or landless peasants living in the remote 
frontier regions of Colombia removed from government authority would seem to partially 
support Wolf's hypothesis.  
 While Eric Wolf's theory of peasant revolt argued the "landless peasant" was 
unlikely to mobilize except under specific conditions, Jeffrey Paige's research, most 
notably on the insurgency in South Vietnam, led him to just the opposite conclusions.     
In Agrarian Revolution (1975), Paige presents a model of peasant revolt that concentrates 
on the political mobility of non-cultivators (landlords) and cultivators (peasants).  Paige 
argues that peasant revolt can be predicted by two variables: (1) source of income (land 
and capital for non-cultivators/land and wages for cultivators); and (2) agricultural 
organization (commercial hacienda, sharecropping/migratory labor, small holding, and 
plantation) [see Figure 1].19   
 Based on this framework, Paige argues that when cultivators derive their income 




16 Goldstone, 59. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Paige, Jeffery M.  Agrarian Revolution: Social Movements and Export Agriculture in the 
Underdeveloped World.    (The Free Press:  New York, 1975), 11. 
20 Paige, 26. 
would support part of Huntington’s hypothesis that small-landowning peasants are the 
most conservative and hence the most loyal to the state.   In contrast, Paige hypothesizes 
that when peasants derive their income from wages, thus tying themselves to market 
forces, they are more prone to accept risk and become revolutionary."21   For Paige, these 
wage earning or revolutionary peasants, are either sharecroppers or migratory laborers.22   
In the South Vietnamese case, Paige concluded that it was no coincidence that the heart 
of the National Liberation Front (Viet Cong) resistance was found in the high intensity 
sharecropping regions of the Mekong Delta.    
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Source:   Skocpol, Theda.  Social Revolutions in the Modern World (1994), 217. 
 
3. Aggregate-Psychological Approaches:  Getting into the Mind of the 
Peasant 
While the above approaches concentrated on land inequality and rural class 
conflict, an equally compelling theory explaining peasant revolt is Ted Robert Gurr’s 
work, Why Men Rebel (1970).   Gurr’s basic premise is his theory of "relative 
deprivation," which he defines as a person's perception of a “gap between what they have 
and what they think they should have.”   Gurr concluded that once individuals believed 
 19 
                                                 
21 Ibid.   
22 Kimmel, 139.   
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relative deprivation existed, they would collectively act against the state or regime that 
they hold responsible for depriving them of a public good.       Gurr's model of Relative 
Deprivation (RD) emphasizes that the "critical point" of a revolution occurs "when 
expectations have risen, owing to some limited reform process, after a prolonged period 
of intense deprivation but then expectations are crushed."23   The ensuing civil strife can 
range from a magnitude of turmoil (high RD within the masses + low RD among the 
elites), conspiracy (high RD among elites + low RD among the masses), and lastly 
internal war (high RD in both the elites and the masses).24   Aggregate psychological 
theorists such as Gurr have not been without their critics.  Theda Skocpol argues that 
these types of approaches, which focus on the behavior of the individual, do not 
adequately account for “revolutions, coups, rebellions, even riots” that are collective and 
organized mobilizations.25   Even more critical is Michael Kimmel who sees this 
approaches downfall in the “state is not seen as a guarantor of social order…in this model 
the state is struggled over when it fails to deliver the goods; it is not struggled with over 
the foundations of political legitimacy.”26     
4. Rational Actor Explanations 
The notion that peasant revolutions are caused by modernization, class conflict, 
and free market forces, conflicts sharply with rational-actor explanations.   Rational-actor 
theorist, most notably Mancur Olson’s The Logic of Collective Action (1971) and Samuel 
Popkin’s Rational Peasant (1979), argue that peasants revolt or mobilize over “public 
goods.”27   Consequently, peasants are able to “free-ride” regardless if they support or 
join the protest, revolt, or rebellion.28   In contrast, those peasants who choose to rebel the 
“cost” can be either financial or their own lives for “public benefits” that are best 
 
23 Goldstone, 22. 
24 Kimmel, 79. 
25 Skocpol, 103. 
26 Kimmel, Michael S.  Revolution:  A Sociological Interpretation.  (Temple University Press:  
Philadelphia, 1990), 81. 
27 Lichbach, Mark I.  “What makes Rational Peasants Revolutionary?:  Dilemma, Paradox, and Irony 
in Peasant Collective Action.”  [Electronic version] World Politics, Vol. 46, Issue 3 (April 1994), 386.     
28 Ibid. 
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uncertain.29  One rational actor theorist has termed this the “rebel’s dilemma” where 
“unless [the] collective action problem is somehow overcome, rational peasants will 
never rebel—even though all peasants stand to gain by rebellion.”30   However, 
historically rational peasants have shown to: (1) cooperate even when it is not in their 
best interest; and (2) will not cooperate when they should.31   From the rational actor 
perspective, these occurrences are best explained by the theory of “selective incentives,” 
which are “private goods or side payments that are available to peasants who participate 
in collective dissent.”32  Ultimately, rational actor theorists conclude that peasants will 
mobilize and overcome the collective action problem by selective incentives motivations 
and the belief of self-benefit.    
5. Wickham-Crowley’s Multi-variant Theory of Peasant Support 
Attempting to make some of sense out of the many competing, contradictory, and 
sometimes complementary theoretical approaches, Timothy Wickham-Crowley 
endeavored to present a more comprehensive theory of peasant support for rural 
insurgencies.   Analyzing ten cases of Latin American peasant insurgencies since 1956, 
Wickham-Crowley applied four variables in each case to determine the regional level of 
peasant support:  (1) agrarian structure, specifically the presence of sharecroppers or 
squatters; (2) agrarian disruption, or disruption of the “moral economy” or subsistence 
economy of peasants; (3) rebellious cultures, based on the correlation between historical 
areas of peasant rebellion as probable supporters of future guerrilla movements; and (4) 
peasant linkage, which attempts to incorporate how various institutional influences (i.e., 
family, religion, politics, and education) either “channeled the guerillas and peasants 
toward or away from one another.”33  Applying these variables Wickham-Crowley 
concluded that regional peasant support of guerrilla movements would occur under the 
following conditions:  
 
29 Lichbach, 387. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Lichbach, 418. 
32 Lichbach, 389. 
33 Wickham-Crowley, Timothy.  Guerillas and Revolution in Latin America:  A comparative study of 
insurgents and regimes since 1956.  (Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ, 1992), 252.    
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(1) The combination of sharecropping or squatting as the predominant 
agrarian structure + the existence of agrarian disruption (subsistence) + 
“preexisting linkages joining the guerrillas to the peasantry” = strong 
peasant support for insurgency. 
(2) The combination of the above agrarian structures + a historically 
rebellious peasant culture = strong peasant support for insurgency. 
(3) The combination of a rebellious peasantry + favorable peasant linkages = strong 
 peasant support for insurgency.34      
As I will examine later in Chapter III, the first combination of variables may provide a 
sound theoretical explanation of peasant support in the Colombian case. 
Yet as remarkable as even Wickham-Crowley’s theory of peasant support is, few if 
any of the theories discussed address the more complicated question of whether land 
reform can help resolve a rural insurgency that is relatively well entrenched.  In practice, 
countries trying to carry out land reform in the midst of conflict have met with limited 
success. These experiences, rather than social science theories about the role of 
landlessness in motivating revolt, have held the most sway with contemporary policy 
makers contemplating the usefulness of land reform.  The following section reviews two of 
the most influential cases for US policymakers in which land reform was unsuccessfully 
attempted as a method of conflict resolution: South Vietnam and El Salvador.                    
C.    SOUTH VIETNAM: "TOO LITTLE, TOO LATE" 
A quick review of the vast literature on the United States involvement and eventual 
withdrawal from South Vietnam leaves little doubt the South Vietnamese peasant was a 
pivotal actor in deciding the outcome of the war.   Ultimately, the Republic of South 
Vietnam collapsed in 1975, because among other things, including a determined and well-
supplied North Vietnamese Army, it failed to win the political support of its rural 
peasantry.    It would seem logical that the rural nature of South Vietnam's insurgency, 
coupled with the country’s extreme inequality in land tenure, especially in the highly 
contested Mekong Delta region, would lead one to believe that land reform was a 
prominent part of South Vietnamese and U.S. strategy.   Yet remarkably, land reform was 
 
34 Wickham-Crowley, 309. 
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not held in high regard by the South Vietnamese government despite pleas from successive 
U.S. administrations much later in the conflict. 
1.    The Land Tenure Issue in South Vietnam 
 Following the defeat of French colonial forces at the epic Battle of Dien Bien Phu 
in May 7, 1954, the United Nations led Geneva Accords abruptly separated French Indo- 
China into the independent states of North and South Vietnam.   Consequently, when 
President Diem took power in 1955, he inherited an infant republic that was agrarian and 
faced an established and entrenched rural insurgency in the form of the Vietminh, the 
predecessors of the Viet Cong.35   The land tenure issue in South Vietnam had largely been 
created by the former French colonial administration.   Beginning in 1867, the French had 
commercialized what was then Cochin China from a subsistence economy to a net exporter 
in rice.   Through an ambitious plan of canal construction, the largely non-producing 
swamps of the Mekong Delta region expanded rice cultivation from less than 400,000 
hectares to 2 million hectares of rice.36   This had the effect of making Vietnam, up to the 
Second World War, one of the world's largest exporters of rice (along with Thailand and 
Burma).37   This however had come at some substantial cost to the Vietnamese peasant 
where the landowning class of French colonials and Vietnamese elites typically demanded 
peasants pay forty to sixty percent of their theoretical rice yield to the landowners.   
Land tenure structures in central South Vietnam where characterized by small 
landholdings of 5-10 hectares.  However, in the more arable providences of the Mekong 
Delta region it was not uncommon to find land holdings of several thousand hectares.38  In 
1955, it was estimated that in the southern region of South Vietnam, of the 2.3 million 
hectares under cultivation, 2.5 percent of the landowners owned approximately one-half of 
 
35 Kolko, Gabriel.  Anatomy of a War:  Vietnam, the United States, and the Modern Historical 
Experience.  (Patheon Books:  New York, 1985), 92.  1-628   Kolko writes that prior to the Geneva 
Accords, the Viet Minh controlled an estimated 60 to 90 percent of what became South Vietnam.  See also 
Walinsky, 299.   
36 Walinsky, 300. 
37 Paige, 282. 
38 Ibid. 
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the cultivated land.39   Furthermore, almost 80 percent of the land in the southern provinces 
was "cultivated by peasants who owned virtually no land whatever."40   This legacy of 
tenant farming and landlessness would continue in the Mekong Delta region well into the 
late 1960's making the Delta one of the five areas with the highest percentage of 
landlessness in the world in 1967, and more importantly to the U.S. and South Vietnamese 
governments, the "center" of Viet Cong resistance in South Vietnam.41      
2.   The Unique Aspect of Competing Land Reform   
The South Vietnamese case presents the unique situation of competing land reforms 
between the government of South Vietnam and the Vietminh and subsequent Viet Cong 
(NLF).   Following the defeat of the Japanese in 1945, the Vietminh had attempted to 
broaden their support in the South by implementing radical land reform policies for the 
peasantry.42   The Vietminh also used land as a means of survivor benefits for the families 
of those who were casualties in the insurgency against the French.43   Underlying the whole 
land reform process by the Vietminh was the notion that if the French won, any gains by 
the peasants in land tenure would be forfeited.   Throughout the war, the Viet Cong would 
use land and more importantly land tenure as an essential source of recruitment.   Gabriel 
Kolko writes in Anatomy of a War (1985), "land presented the NLF with a powerful 
weapon for mobilizing support as needed, and preference went to those who aided the 
Revolution."44   This stood in stark comparison to the mandatory draft by the South 
Vietnamese government where there was little benefit or incentive for those who fought 
against the insurgents.   
3. Land Reform Fails Under Diem (1955-1961) 
Faced with an insurgency-led competing land reform policy, and an overall lack of 
rural security, President Ngo Dinh Diem's failed to present the South Vietnamese peasantry 
with a competitive land reform policy in the immediate years following the French defeat.   
 
39 Walinsky, 301. 
40 Ibid.   
41 Prosterman, 753. 
42 Prosterman, 754. 
43 Maranto and Tuchman, 254. 
44 Kolko, 130. 
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This was despite vigorous demands by the Kennedy administration for Diem to implement 
land reform, a plea that was being met with some success in Latin America under the 
Alliance for Progress.   Diem initially resisted U.S. attempts to implement a land reform 
policy not only because he wanted to prevent being labeled a U.S. puppet, but also to 
ensure that the fragile ties of those loyal to his regime would remain.45   This last element 
is extremely important for understanding Diem's reluctance to implement a land reform 
policy.    
What many fail to remember is that the political climate of post-French colonialism 
in South Vietnam was more complex than merely Diem's regime versus a Communist 
insurgency.   Within South Vietnam Diem was forced to challenge other armed non-state 
actors, most notably: the Binh Xuyen, a secretive bandit organization with nationalist roots 
that dominated politics and illicit activities in Saigon; the Cao Dai religious sect, whose 1.5 
to 2 million faithful followed a religion mixed of Christianity, Buddhism, and 
Confucianism; and the Hoa Hao, another religious sect that controlled a majority of the 
Mekong Delta region.46   Using "bribery, persuasion, and finally force," Diem eliminated 
the Binh Xuyen and Hoa Hao sect, while entering into an "uneasy alliance" with the Cao 
Dai sect.47 To capitalize on these moves, Diem's administration survived on nepotism and 
what he would term "personalism."48  This "personalism" was extended to all facets of 
Diem's administration including the military.  It would even escalate to extremes in his 
creation of the Personalist Labor Revolutionary Party (Can Lao Nhan Vi Cach Mang 
Dang), which was essentially a national organization of informants.     
The United States was sensitive to Diem's protection of South Vietnam's 
sovereignty and did not insist on land reform in fear of "fatally weakening " the Diem 
 
45 Hunt, Richard A.  Pacification:  The American Struggle for Vietnam's Hearts and Minds.   
(Westview Press:  Boulder, 1995), 14.   
46.  The Pentagon Papers:  The Defense Department History of United States Decisionmaking on 
Vietnam, The Senator Gravel Edition, Vol. I.   (Beacon Press:  Boston, 1971,),  295.     
47 The Pentagon Papers, 298.   Gabriel Kolko also writes in Anatomy of a War, that under Diem's 
attempt to consolidate his power, 40,000 political prisoners were imprisoned by 1958, with another 12,000 
killed from 1955-1957 (89). 
48 The Pentagon Papers, 299.   
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government.49    Yet with U.S. persistence and funding, Diem did concede to implement 
"limited" land reform laws in 1955 that: (1) resettled peasants on uncultivated land; (2) 
expropriated land holdings in excess of 100 hectares (247 acres) with redistribution to 
tenant farmers; (3) reestablished tenant-land lord relations.   However, South Vietnam's 
first land reform effort was doomed to failure because it distanced peasants who under the 
new laws were forced to pay rents of 15 -25% to landlords, whereas under the Vietminh 
plan had paid little to nothing.  Diem's land reform also alienated the peasants because of a 
system of corruption and favoritism that benefited, "Northerners, refugees, and Catholics," 
who received 244,000 of the 650,000 hectares Diem had confiscated.50  The French 
colonial lands Diem had expropriated remained "undistributed" by the South Vietnamese.51  
Furthermore, in villages where returning landlords could not remove Viet Minh influence, 
landlords paid normally 30% of their profits to government and military officials to remove 
the Viet Minh.52
Other factors that hindered Diem's land reform were the general apathy and poor 
administration from the program’s leaders and administrators.   As an example, the South 
Vietnamese government had attempted in 1956 to utilize the Confederation of Vietnamese 
Labor that was organizing tenant farmers and supporting the government's land reform 
policy.53   Simultaneously, the Diem government organized a Farmers' Association that 
was tied to "province officials and with landowners."54   As an interest group, the Farmers 
Association was directly opposed to Vietnamese peasant groups, and by 1961 had strongly 
co-opted police and military forces to capitulate the peasant unions by forced imprisonment 
of its leaders.55     At the end of 1961, Diem's land reform effort ended with only "one out 
of 10 tenant families" having received any benefits.56      
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4. "Land to the Tiller":  South Vietnam's Last Gasp at Land Reform 
It is quite paradoxical that while the United States was strongly advocating and 
funding land reform in Latin America as part of the Alliance for Progress, during this same 
period, 1962 to 1965, the United States provided no land reform assistance to South 
Vietnam.   One possible explanation is that although successive U.S. administrations were 
well aware of the land tenure problem, their main focus was on stabilizing the Diem regime 
through increased military aid and security.   It is also possible to speculate that efforts to 
get President Diem to implement U.S. advocated reforms, both in the military forces and 
socio-economically, were fruitless.  This argument is supported by President Kennedy’s 
November 1963 decision to support a “regime change” that resulted in the South 
Vietnamese military coup and assignation of President Diem.   A decision that many in the 
U.S. administration felt was necessary but would latter come to regret.   The prospects for 
U.S. supported land reform in South Vietnam appeared no better during the 1966 through 
1967 period as U.S. troop commitments to South Vietnam intensified and land reform 
appeared far removed from the White House policy agenda.   
Following the virtual drought of U.S. assistance for land reform in South Vietnam, 
the U.S. once again began to campaign the South Vietnamese government to implement 
land reform beginning in 1967.   In 1967, the U.S. led Civil Operations and Revolutionary 
Development Support (CORDS) was at the forefront of the counter-insurgency strategy 
that would come to be known as "pacification."   For CORDS, one of the cornerstones of 
their pacification efforts was to press the Vietnamese government towards land reform.  
This was heavily resisted once again by the South Vietnamese government despite 
President Johnson's personal support of the policy.57   Furthermore, CORDS and USAID 
(United States Agency for International Development) disagreed on the scope of land 
reform policy.  USAID did not want to see land reform expropriations in Viet Cong held 
territory or territory that had been "recaptured from the Communist."58    
 
57 Hunt, 105. 
58 Ibid. 
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What made the "Land to the Tiller" program so promising when it was implemented 
in March 1970 was that the initiative came from the Thieu regime itself.   At his 
inauguration, President Thieu declared "agrarian reform as second only to security."59  
Under Thieu's "land to the tiller" program, the peasant paid nothing for expropriated land, 
whereas the government compensated the landowner for land transferred.   This last point 
had been the crucial "sticking point" that had led to the downfall of Diem's program, where 
landowners vehemently objected to expropriation.  Thieu's land reform policy differed 
greatly from Diem's in that not only did it pass through both the Lower House and South 
Vietnamese Senate, but it also reduced the upper limit of transferred land from 100 hectares 
to 15 hectares, making in essence a small owner class of farmers.  In the Mekong Delta, 
this was even more dramatic where land ownership was set at no more than three 
hectares.60    
The purpose of the land to the tiller program was to give the average South 
Vietnamese peasant "both a political and economic stake in South Vietnam's future."61   It 
was also the first genuine attempt for the South Vietnamese government to offer a 
formidable challenge to a decade of Viet Cong land reform.   Unlike land reform under 
Diem, land to the tiller gave full land ownership to peasants who tilled their land regardless 
of "political allegiance or even lack of a legal claim."   While Thieu concentrated his land 
reform efforts in the Mekong Delta, Thieu's Annam or central Vietnam land reform efforts 
were much more conservative, as he was well aware of the agricultural elite's opposition to 
land reform in Central Vietnam.   Consequently, Thieu knew land reform would have more 
success in the Mekong Delta where already the Viet Cong had redistributed much land, and 
where lack of security had made land owners "eager to sell out."62    Nevertheless, despite 
any successes that Thieu’s land reform had in redistributing land, the United States 
withdrawal  was  nearing  completion,  and  in  the  final analysis the efforts of land reform  
 
59 Salter, 728. 
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could do little to bring about security against what was largely becoming a war against the 
North Vietnamese Army (NVA), vice against the black, pajama clad South Vietnamese 
peasantry. 
D.   THE CASE OF EL SALVADOR 
 The Salvadoran civil war (1979-1991) remains one of the darker periods of late 
twentieth century history in the western hemisphere.   El Salvador’s civil war became 
marked by three armed actors: a repressive regime and military, paramilitary “death 
squads,” and an urban and rural insurgency group, Frente Farabundo Marti para la 
Liberacion Nacional (FMLN).  More importantly, the war cost the lives of 75,000 
Salvadorans and displaced one million people.63    
One of the most puzzling questions of the Salvadoran civil war was why did the 
land reform policies implemented in 1980, which have been characterized as the “most 
extensive non-socialist reform ever undertaken in Latin America,” fail to resolve the rural 
conflict, and instead engulfed the country into a broader more violent war?    When 
scholars look back upon the preconditions or causes of the Salvadoran civil war (1981-
1991) they are divided into two groups:  those who believe the misdistribution of land was 
a fundamental cause of insurrection (Prosterman, Riedinger, and Temple 1981); and those 
who believe it was factors such as inequality of income that led to the violence (Muller and 
Seligson 1987).   One thing that is for sure, even if land inequality was not a “pre-
condition” of the civil war, the failed implementation of land reform in 1981 certainly 
inflamed the armed actors.   
1. The Land Tenure Problem in El Salvador 
As in much of Latin America, the land inequality issue in El Salvador had deep 
historical roots.   During the 20th century, the peasant rebellion of 1932 had cost an 
estimated 7,000 – 30,000 lives, the majority of whom were peasants.64  During the 1960’s 
the “green revolution” (e.g., fertilizers, mechanization, and pesticides) left large portions of 
 
63 Lopez, Humberto.  “The Economic and Social Costs of Armed Conflict in El Salvador.”  The World 
Bank, Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit, Dissemination Note (January 2003, No. 8) 
64 Prosterman, Roy L., Jeffrey M. Riedinger and Mary N. Temple.  “Land Reform and the El Salvador 
Crisis.  [Electronic version] International Security, 6.1, (Summer, 1981), 60. 
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rural labor unemployed.   Further compounding the labor issue was that the “rise of cotton 
and sugar” had also meant the “conversion of extensive cattle and grain haciendas…and 
thus entailed a large-scale expulsion of peasants previously allowed to occupy estate 
lands.”65   All of this had the effect that between 1961 to 1975, the percentage of 
Salvadoran farm families that were landless, increased from 12 to 41 percent.66  In 1980, 
just prior to a major escalation in the internal conflict, El Salvador’s 1.8 million landless 
peasants composed almost 38 percent of El Salvador’s entire population.67   
2. Land Reform and the 1932 Peasant Rebellion 
Land reform in El Salvador has a history of being met with swift violence from the 
landed oligarchy.   In 1931, President Arturo Araujo won the national election with land 
reform as one of his platform items.   When he failed to “deliver the goods,” rural strikes 
and protest followed as well as a coup d´etat by General Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez 
in December 1931.  In response to the coup, the Salvadoran Communist Party (PCS), 
which had been both “ignored and repressed” by the government prior to the coup, now 
attempted to make their move onto the national stage and called for a peasant insurrection 
in January 1932.   However, the government quickly acted against the plotters who were 
led by Farabundo Marti, putting down the revolt in three days.  To further emphasize their 
belief in the status quo, the government executed 25,000 peasants and workers, many of 
whom had not even participated in the rebellion.68   Michael McClintock notes that this 
event, later termed the matanza (killing), spurred successive decades in which the 
Salvadoran elites entrusted the military to govern for reasons of internal security.69 
 
65 Kinkaid, A. Douglas.  “Peasants into Rebels:  Community and Class in Rural El Salvador.”   
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Marking the beginning of over five decades in which “the Salvadoran upper class ruled the 
economy, the military ruled the polity.70      
3. The Mobilization of El Salvador's Peasants 
In the decade prior to the 1980 land reform, peasant movements in El Salvador 
where segmented into three groups:  (1) the Christian Peasant Federation (FECCAS), 
which was supported by the Catholic Church, the Christian Democratic Party, and the 
Latin American Social Christian organization; (2) the Salvadoran Communal Union 
(UCS), whose organization was begun by the American Institute for Free Labor 
Development (AIFLD), a U.S. supported anti-communist movement; and (3) the National 
Democratic Organization (ORDEN), which was the armed peasant extension of large 
landowners and the internal security forces.71   
Of the three, FECCAS would come to be perceived as the greatest threat to 
security forces and the landed elite.    FECCAS had formed out of the Christian Base 
Communities established by the Catholic Church.  Using the doctrine of “liberation 
theology,” progressive segments of the Church wanted to instill in the poor and peasants 
a sense of collective vice individual action.72   Out of this, FECCAS became a leftist 
peasant organization, which many times were in contradiction to what the official Church 
hierarchy was trying to accomplish.    By the mid-1970’s FECCAS had joined with the 
Farmworkers’ Union (UTC) to form the Farmworkers’ Federation (FTC) with an 
estimated 10,000 to 12,000 members.73   As the conflict intensified in the late 1970s, 
these Catholic leftist peasant groups would form a core of revolutionary rural 
insurrection. 
The second largest peasant organization, Salvadoran Communal Union (UCS), 
had its origins in the Alliance for Progress.   Supported by the United States through 
USAID via AIFLD, the Catholic Church, and the Christian Democratic Party, UCS was 
 
70 Wickham-Crowley, Timothy P.  Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America:  A Comparative Study 
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not an organization of tenant or landless peasants, but rather rural smallholding 
peasants.74  AIFLD through the mid-1960s and late 1970’s provided UCS with 
agriculture assistance in technical training and most importantly credit.   The organization 
had grown to 50,000 members by 1975 and increasingly demanded improvements in 
wages and landlord tenant contracts, putting UCS into direct conflict with large 
landowners.75   
As both the UCS and FTC began to exert political pressure on the state for 
reforms, those who supported upholding the status quo formed a counter peasant 
movement called ORDEN.  As the name suggest, ORDEN was to enforce the status quo 
through an organization of informants and paramilitary units.  ORDEN’s ranks came 
mainly from National Guardsman who once finished with their obligatory service, 
returned to their villages to work in many cases covertly for ORDEN.   In essence, the 
organization, which was led by the country’s elites, became a protection racket, 
guaranteeing its members jobs, credit, and government positions for joining the 
movement and repressing any reformist movements.   Wickham-Crowley also notes that 
“occasionally” it was the granting of land to ORDEN members that provided the material 
end of gaining their loyalty.76   
4. The Radicalization of El Salvador’s Peasant Movement 
Peasant calls for land reform were met with predictive staunch resistance from the 
land owning elite and segments of the Salvadoran officers' corp.  While the “collective 
military regime” system that ruled El Salvador from the 1950’s to 1979 had allowed the 
military to govern, it was not without the underlying assumption that the Salvadoran 
economic elite always held an economic veto.   This had been the case when land reform 
was proposed in 1975.  Here the Molina government (1975-1976) had made promises of 
land reform, yet did not follow through with them due to rejection by the elites.    
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The increasing oppression from El Salvador’s military regime by 1976 had 
created the conditions by which peasant groups such as FECCAS and UTC were able to 
combine their efforts to mobilize peasants on a national level.   Both of these groups 
joined the larger leftist Revolutionary Popular Bloc (BPR), which was composed of 
urban laborers, students, and the urban poor, to conduct strikes, land invasions, and mass 
urban protest.77  By 1980, the BPR was composed of almost 80,000 members, and 
directly supported the armed guerillas of the FMLN and the political arm of the 
insurgency, Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR).    
While FECCAS and the UTC had joined the larger FMLN and FDR, the 100,000 
strong UCS would come to play an important but short-lived role in the 1980 land reform 
implemented by the reformist civilian-military junta that ousted the Romero government 
in the 1979 coup.   During this time UCS had the support of moderates in the Christian 
Democratic Party, the military reformist in the junta, and the United States.   However, 
once land reform broke down under the political violence of the right, UCS splintered 
and much of its supporters moved towards the insurgents.   
5. Land Reform and Conflict 1980:  The Reformers Fail   
When land reform did come to El Salvador in 1980 the reform was initiated by 
the reformist civilian-military junta.  With mass demonstrations of over 100,000 people 
occurring in San Salvador, the junta knew if something dramatic was not done, 
widespread violence was to follow.  With support from the Christian Democrats, the one 
political party that traditionally opposed the decades of military governance, “Phase I” of 
El Salvador’s land reform was enacted.   Phase I was a significant land reform in that 14 
percent of El Salvador’s total land area (289,000) was redistributed to 85,000 peasants.78  
The junta had envisioned three phases of land reform:  (1) Phase I, the expropriation of 
“all farms over 500 hectares”; (2) Phase II, a further expropriation of farms 100-500 
hectares in size; and (3) Phase III, a “land to the tiller” decree that gave peasants title to 
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the land they cultivated.79   In the war’s aftermath, many have cited that the great 
downfall of the 1980 land reform program was the simple fact that no phase of the 
program made, “provisions for the landless segment of the rural population.”80   That is 
the very segment of the rural population that many have theorized is the most likely to 
rebel.     
Another reason that the junta’s land reform program failed to resolve peasant 
grievances against the state was that as peasants attempted to claim the benefits of the 
new land reform, they were met with violence from right wing “death squads.”   The 
government’s failure to control the indiscriminate killings by both the armed forces and 
paramilitaries created the conditions necessary for the guerillas to attempt to overthrow 
the government.   T. David Mason writes that as both the Salvadoran military and 
paramilitary units began to attack villages indiscriminately, “Remaining neutral was no 
longer an option…one is compelled either to join the insurgents in search of protection or 
become a refugee.”81   The rift caused by the junta’s land reform laws would lead to an 
eventual removal of the “reformers” from government.  In the subsequent years leading 
up to the peace accords, not only would Phase III never see implementation, but any 
gains made by Phase I and II land reforms would be legally revoked and lands returned to 
their pre-land reform owners.     
E. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, what do the cases of South Vietnam and El Salvador teach us about 
the feasibility of land reform as a means of conflict resolution?   More specifically, is it 
possible to carry out land reform in the midst of armed conflict?  And are peasants 
willing to abandon the insurgents once they have already "thrown in their lot" with them?  
First turning to the South Vietnamese case, it is a common misperception that because the 
war ultimately ended in the collapse of South Vietnam that the "land to the tiller" 
program was a failure.  By all accounts, the program succeeded in its main goal of 
redistributing large amounts of land.  By April 1973, the Thieu government had "issued 
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titles for 2.5 million acres and distributed about 75 percent of this land to new owners."82   
Furthermore, in the period from 1970 to 1973, "land to the tiller" had reduced land 
tenancy from 60 to 10 percent.83    
On the other hand, as I have argued, the downfall of "land to the tiller" stemmed 
from the fact that it was "too little, too late."  By the time President Thieu implemented 
his “land to the tiller” program, the war in the South had transformed from an intra-state 
conflict with the insurgents, to a more conventional inter-state war with the North 
Vietnamese Army.  Coupled with the withdrawal of most U.S. forces by 1973, the 
prospects of avoiding defeat for the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) seemed remote.    
While "land to the tiller" was successful at redistributing land, what effect did it have on 
undermining peasant support for the insurgency?   A 1972 USAID report based on field 
interviews and studies of the Mekong Delta region spoke favorably of this crucial 
political aspect of "Land to the Tiller:"  
The Land to the Tiller Program is a splendid means to pacification…It is 
helping turn a once-disaffected, politically neutral mass of potential and 
sometimes actual revolutionaries into middle class farmers in support of 
the regime.84
However, it is difficult to quantify just how effective "Land to the Tiller" was in reducing 
peasant recruitment and support.   Roy Prosterman argues "Land to the Tiller" 
contributed to the reduction of Viet Cong recruitment from a pre-1969 average of 7,000 
recruits a month, to a drop of 3,500 recruits a month by late 1969.85   Yet there were 
other factors that may have contributed to the decline in Viet Cong recruitment.   The 
Viet Cong infrastructure suffered significant losses during the Tet Offensive (1968), 
which continued under the controversial "Phoenix Program," a joint U.S.-South 
Vietnamese state-sanctioned campaign of kidnapping and assassination of key members 
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of the Viet Cong infrastructure (VCI).   Furthermore, by 1969 an estimated 70 percent of 
all enemy combatants in the South were soldiers of the North Vietnamese Army.86      
Moving ahead to the 1980 Salvadoran case, it is clear from the literature that U.S. 
policymakers working on U.S.-El Salvador policy believed South Vietnam's "Land to the 
Tiller" had been to a large degree successful.   From a U.S. perspective, the 1980 U.S. 
supported land reforms in El Salvador, specifically Phase III, were almost a "carbon 
copy" of South Vietnam's "Land to the Tiller" program.87   Yet as Michael McClintock 
notes, the Carter administration's insistence on the program contradicted sharply with the 
views of the Salvadoran elite: 
Phase III presents the most confusing aspect of the reform program, and 
could prove especially troublesome for the U.S. because it was decreed 
without advance discussion, except in very limited government circles, 
and, we are told, it is considered by key Salvadoran officials as a 
misguided and U.S. imposed initiative.88
Nevertheless, the implementation of Phase I did reach a measure of success in the large 
amount of land it redistributed to peasants.    
 Yet while this answers the feasibility question of land reform implemented amid 
conflict in the Salvadoran case, the equally important question of land reform's 
effectiveness in quelling rural insurgency had just the opposite intended effect in El 
Salvador.   As previously mentioned, not only was the 1980 land reform program fatally 
flawed by not addressing the landless issue, but more importantly, both the 
“revolutionary left and the conservative right had an interest in seeing land reform fail, 
because its success would weaken their claims to peasant support.”89    With neither 
political  support  "from below"  or "above," the reform minded ruling junta did not have  
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enough "political capital" to reap any positive results from their redistributive land reform 
policy.   As Chapter IV discusses, this scenario may have important implications in the 
Colombian case.   
 A last element that deserves discussion is just how effective was the U.S. role in 
implementing land reform in the two cases.    In the case of South Vietnam, the United 
States was unable to pressure the South Vietnamese government to implement land 
reform much sooner in the conflict.  Part of this lies with the United States own 
difficulties in coming to terms with what the real nature of the war was.   Yet another 
more powerful reason that also applies to the Salvadoran case was the fact that to the 
United States, both of these conflicts represented a much larger battle between the United 
States and the Soviet Union.   Faced with this perception, the United States supported 
successive Vietnamese and Salvadoran regimes, which although many in the United 
States believed were inept, corrupt, and to say the least undemocratic, were nevertheless 
on the “frontlines” in the war against the Communist.     In the “fight to the death” 
mentality of the Cold War, the United States conceded significant leverage for land 
reform’s implementation, allowing both the South Vietnamese and Salvadoran regimes to 
continue the status quo without placing conditional requirements such as land reform on 
large sums of foreign aid.  Arguably, a similar U.S. policy "mentality" exists in 
Colombia, as the country is now on the “frontline” of both the "war on drugs" and the 
GWOT.       
 In the final analysis, the cases of South Vietnam and El Salvador provide strong 
evidence that land reform can be successfully implemented during conflict.  However, the 
more daunting issue of post-implementation and quelling peasant mobilization of rural 
insurgencies is not as clear.   While there is some evidence to support land reforms role in 
undermining peasant support in the South Vietnamese case, the Salvadoran case 
demonstrates that land reform's very implementation can have the undesired affect of 
greatly increasing political violence.  Here again this may be a realistic possibility of any 
redistributive land reform implemented under the current political conditions in 
Colombia.     
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The next chapter applies the framework developed in the first part of this chapter 
to the case of Colombia in order to examine more closely the causes of peasant resistance 
there.  It considers the extent to which conflicts over land have generated rural violence 
historically and then focuses specifically on the role of land in the escalation of the 
current conflict in the mid to late 1990s.  This analysis is essential for understanding 
whether or not land reform can contribute to the resolution of the current conflict in 
Colombia.  Chapter IV then addresses questions about the feasibility of land reform 















                                                
III. THE NEXUS BETWEEN LAND AND CONFLICT IN 
COLOMBIA 
Get off this estate.  What for? Because it is mine.  Where did you get it? 
From my father. Where did he get it? From his father.  And where did he 




It is widely held by many Colombians and many within the international 
community that much of the current rural violence in Colombia is a symptom of a much 
deeper and historical conflict over land.    A recent report by the NGO International 
Organization for Migration (IOM), whose “Strengthening of Democracy” initiative in 
Colombia is partially funded by USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), stated:  
The armed conflict in Colombia is rooted in agrarian disputes emerging in 
the middle of the last century.  It continues to center around the struggle to 
gain territorial advantages and free access to land.1   
Yet, do these “root causes” provide sufficient explanation for the current rural violence?   
This chapter examines the relationship between land and conflict in Colombia and its 
evolution over three distinct phases of conflict.   The first part of this chapter starts with 
the colonization of Colombia’s internal frontiers beginning in the late 19th century and 
follows the land conflict through the period of La Violencia (1948 - 1958).   The second 
part of this chapter examines the emergence of FARC in the mid-1960s and concludes 
with the rise and fall of Colombia’s national peasant organization, ANUC (Asociacion 
Nacional de Usuarios Campesinos) during the early 1970s.   The final part of this chapter 
focuses on the “coca boom” that began in the 1980s and examines how the rural conflict 
escalated in the mid-1990s due to the process of "reverse land reform," and increase in 
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B. COLONIZATION AND THE LIBERAL AGRARIAN REFORM 
MOVEMENT (1870 – 1948)  
Colombia has long been and remains a country tied to its land.   Not unlike other 
Latin American countries, the struggle between landowners and peasants was inherited 
by a legacy of Spanish colonialism and the haciendas or large estate system that ensued.   
During Spanish colonial rule much of modern-day Colombia were terrenos baldíos or 
public lands comprising a vast unsettled "internal frontier" that could be homesteaded.2    
The late 19th and early 20th century saw a large migration of Colombian peasants from the 
"highlands" into the vast public lands of Colombia's "middle altitudes and lowlands."3   
This migration by colonos or "landless squatters" created an expansion into previously 
unpopulated areas, clearing the frontier for their own crops and village settlements.4    
However, the clearing of the frontiers also brought large numbers of land entrepreneurs.  
These entrepreneurs or speculators specifically sought to “monopolize” colono land 
because: (1) it was already cleared and tilled for large-scale hacienda style cultivation; 
and (2) peasants already settled on these lands provided a readily available source of 
cheap labor.5  The issue of labor was especially critical as poor communications and 
transportation at this stage of Colombia's economic development limited the existence of 
a “mobile pool of wage-earning laborers.”6  Consequently, these land entrepreneurs, in 
their desire to secure an increasingly scarce source of labor began a process of "labor 
acquisition" claiming property rights over the terrenos baldíos.7   
Although land legislation passed during the 1870s and 1880s gave colonos 
homesteading rights to lands they farmed, the associated surveying cost allowed the more 
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seventy-five percent Colombia’s territory.   See LeGrand, Catherine.  Frontier Expansion and Peasant 
Protest in Colombia, 1850-1936. (University of New Mexico Press: Albuquerque, 1986), 1.     
3 Bergquist, Charles, Ricardo Penaranda, and Gonzalo Sanchez ed. Violence in Colombia: The 
Contemporary Crisis in Historical Perspective.  (SR Books: Wilmington, Delaware, 1992), 33. 
4 Bergquist, 34. 
5 LaGrand, 38.   
6 Ibid. 
7 Bergquist, 32.       
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wealthy middle and upper classes to claim ownership through legal or illegal means.8   
Thus, the situation was created where land entrepreneurs with newly “acquired” 
legitimate or illegitimate land titles would force colonos to either to be evicted or sign 
labor contracts becoming “tenants of the haciendas.”9  The repercussions of this era of 
land entrepreneurship was the "monopolization of immense extensions of territory, much 
more than they possibly could put to use."10     
Prior to 1874 the "relative isolation, poverty, and illiteracy" of colonos resulted in 
very little resistance to either their eviction or cooption into tenant farmers by land 
entrepreneurs.11   Yet in the period from 1874 to 1920, peasants, armed with pro-
homesteading laws passed in 1874 and 1882, began to resist land entrepreneurs through 
petitions to the government in Bogotá; legal actions against land speculators; and at times 
resistance until forcefully evicted or arrested.12   Land entrepreneurs were able to thwart 
the efforts of colonos and the pro-peasant land laws, "using administrative procedures, 
intimidation, and force."13  The period of 1874 to 1930 would see over 450 large 
confrontations between these two groups.14   Although the government in Bogotá was 
aware of the increasing conflict between colonos and land entrepreneurs, it was unable to 
exert any real influence in support of pro-colono land laws beyond the capital.   Rather it 
relied on local and municipal authorities to adjudicate these disputes.   What would 
eventually bring the "agrarian problem" into the national spotlight was not the plight of 
the colonos, but Colombia's rapid move to industrialization during the late 1920s and 
early 1930s.    
In the midst of an international depression and a rising inflation rate, Colombia 
was becoming a net importer of food.   Colombia's policymakers believed it imperative 
for the rural economy to increase agriculture production in order to provide low-cost 
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foodstuff for the emerging industrial workforce.  This would enable manufacturers to 
keep wage costs down, freeing up capital for investment.  Both Liberals and 
Conservatives agreed the inefficient latifundias were the source of the rural economy’s 
stagnation.   Returning to an earlier Liberal philosophy, policymakers shaped land policy 
to integrate "poor tenants, sharecroppers, and colonos" and initiate a rural middle class 
reinvigorating the rural economy.15    
With the political will of the national government on the peasants' side, the period 
of 1928 through 1936 saw a second major wave of peasant colonization characterized by 
large uncoordinated squatter or land invasions of latifundias, cattle ranches, and banana 
plantations.  Many of these second waves of colonos were unemployed urban workers 
and rural wageworkers that were jobless as a result of the Depression.16   Landowners 
found it increasingly difficult to evict colonos, not only because of the national 
government’s support of the colonos, but also because leftist political parties (i.e. the 
Communist Party of Colombia-Partido Comunista de Colombia or PCC, Jorge Eliecer 
Gaitán's Revolutionary Leftist National Union-Unión Nacional Izquierdista 
Revolucionaria or UNIR, and the National Agrarian party-Partido Agrarista Nacional-
PAN), were effective in mobilizing the peasants.   By 1936, the "colono problem" was 
perceived to be a legitimate threat by landowners and even those within government as a 
precursor to social revolution.17  Adding to the government's dilemma was the realization 
that the economic justification of supporting the colonos was not working.  Instead of 
producing more food for urban workers, peasants in zones where land invasions were 
taking place were producing less than before.18   
Two factors would decidedly swing national policy back to side of the 
landowners: (1) colono political influence at the national level weakened because of, 
"cooptation of the movement's political leaders…and the resurgence of the industrial 
working class as a power base for urban politicians," making peasant political support 
much less important; and (2) the emergence of powerful landowner interest groups who 
 
15 LeGrand, 98. 
16 LeGrand, 109. 
17 LeGrand, 133. 
18 LeGrand, 134. 
43 
                                                
were able to affect land policy at the national level.    Under increasingly effective 
landowner pressure, Liberal President López Pumarejo enacted "Land Law 200" in 1936.    
Some believed Law 200 would help modernize Colombia's "chaotic" agrarian system and 
"synchronize" it with Colombia's emerging "capitalist development."19  Others have 
characterized the law as essentially a "landowner solution" to legitimize "large agrarian 
landholdings" in the face of growing peasant mobilization.20    
In the period following the passage of Law 200, "squatting" and land occupations 
by peasants would still occur but on a much smaller scale than during the previous 
decade.   For many hacendados, the tenant issue was still unresolved by Law 200, 
causing many haciendas to turn to cattle ranching with its minimal labor requirements 
and "to avoid land claims by tenants and sharecroppers."21   Adding to this, Law 200 had 
done little to alleviate an increasingly inflationary economy that saw a major drop in 
agriculture production, falling wages, and a spiraling cost of living.22     In 1938, 
President Eduardo Santos, who although a member of the Liberal Party, represented a 
moderate faction, did nothing to further advance Lopez efforts at land reform and 
property rights.   In 1942 when Lopéz was elected once again, the Liberal Party was 
fractionalized by the populist leftist leader Jorge Eliecer Gaitán, and by the urban 
working class represented by Santos.   Adding to this division was a Conservative Party 
whose landed elite and industrialist supporters were continuing to seek revancha 
(revenge) for the "Law 200" reforms and felt increasingly threatened by the rising 
political strength of the urban labor unions.23   
With a fractionalized Liberal party, the Conservative Party was able to pass "Law 
100" in 1944.   Law 100 sought to solidify the balance of rural power back to the small 
 
19 Richani, 18. 
20 Sanchez, Gonzalo and Donny Meertens.  Bandits, Peasants, and Politics:  The Case of "La 
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21 Richani, 21. 
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labor intensive agriculture production to cattle ranching to avoid the increasing land claims by "tenants and 
sharecroppers." 
23 Richani, 20. 
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landowning elite, making it increasingly difficult if not impossible for colonos to claim 
property rights.24    More significantly, Law 100: 
Signified the culmination of the modern alliance between the government 
and the large landowners that began in 1936.  The aim of dissolving the 
latifundia system by turning tenants and colonos into independent small 
holders had been completely abandoned.25   
The increasing friction between the country’s two major political parties led to an 
unsuccessful Conservative coup attempt in 1944 and the eventual resignation of Lopéz in 
1946.  The election of Conservative candidate Mariano Ospina Perez in 1946 began a 
new phase in political violence between the two parties.    
 The move of Conservatives against the growing mobilization of both peasants 
and urban workers reached a boiling point after the assassination of Liberal presidential 
candidate Eliécer Gaitán on April 9, 1948.    The charismatic Gaitán had come to 
represent a popular reformist agenda of "economic redistribution and political 
participation" among the urban and peasant masses.26   Although never proven, Liberals 
immediately believed that the Conservative oligarchy was responsible for Gaitán’s death.  
The assassination of Gaitán, would set off a national Liberal uprising beginning with 
three days of violent looting and rioting in Bogotá (El Bogotazo), eventually spreading 
throughout the countryside.     
In what has been characterized as one of the "greatest armed mobilization of 
peasants in the recent history of the western hemisphere," the "undeclared" civil war or 
La Violencia would move away from the cities becoming a war of peasant against 
peasant.27  Areas of prior colono and landowner conflict, such as the departments of 
Tolima, Valle, Antioquia, and Caldas were especially heavily contested during La 
Violencia.28  Casualties in Tolima alone numbered 35,294.29 Overall, La Violencia  
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(1945-1958) would claim the lives of an estimated 200,000 Colombians.30  In an answer 
to the Liberal uprisings, specifically in the countryside, the Conservative Party, with the 
support of the National Police, the armed forces, and the Catholic Church, began to arm 
peasants under their control.31  By 1950, La Violencia had fragmented the entire country 
into zones under Liberal, Conservative, or Communist guerrilla control.32  The violence 
in the rural countryside evolved into more than political party grievances as Sanchez and 
Meertens write in Bandits, Peasants, and Politics (2001): 
Rural terror would have other visible consequences:  the plunder of land 
and property whose owners had been killed or threatened into selling; the 
confiscation of harvests and livestock; the burning of houses, sugarcane 
crushers, and processing plants; the physical coercion of discontented rural 
workers, provoking massive migration to the cities, or removing peasants 
to areas controlled by the party with which they were affiliated. 
Ultimately, rural terror rearranged social classes in the countryside and 
relations of leadership and power in the different regions.33
Within these zones, guerrilla groups began to exercise a "measure of independence" as 
shown by the guerrillas in the Llanos who began to plan their own agrarian reform.34   
Furthermore, in 1953, a Movimiento Popular de Liberacíon Nacional was formed 
attempting to unite all guerrilla groups behind a general land reform agenda.35   
  The failure of the Conservative government to end the violence brought a 
"disillusioned army" to execute a military coup in June 1953, led by army chief of staff 
General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla.36  As president, Rojas Pinilla enjoyed initial success in 
quelling the violence by offering a general amnesty for those directly involved in the 
Violencia.   However, reoccurring hostilities in Tolima between Communist guerrillas 
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and the military, and Pinilla's desire to create a third party alliance between the military 
and populace, brought about a bi-partisan effort of Conservative and Liberal politicians to 
replace Pinilla with a five-man military junta in 1957.37   This was agreed to with the 
understanding that the government would be turned over to civilian control.   
The resulting coalition between Liberal and Conservative politicians led to the 
formation of the Frente Nacional or National Front in 1958.   By "eliminating electoral 
competition", both parties agreed to successively alternate the presidency between 
Liberal and Conservative candidates for a period of fifteen years (1958-1974).38    
Furthermore, legislative representation as well as all ministerial positions would be 
equally shared.  Inherent to the National Front was the prohibition of any third party 
forces.   Although the joining of the Liberal and Conservative coalition brought some 
peace to the cities it did nothing to stop the violence in the countryside.  While La 
Violencia had “officially” ended, the countryside became the site of a new wave of 
violence caused by the phenomenon of bandolerismo or political banditry. 
The phenomenon of bandolerismo is interesting to note as it: (1) foreshadowed 
the rise of paramilitary groups in contemporary Colombia; and (2) brought about 
significant US backed Colombian counter-insurgency efforts against both the bandoleros 
and the smaller and isolated Communist and Liberal guerrilla groups.  Originally, these 
"bandits" were Liberal peasants who gained voluntary support of large landowners and 
the Liberal peasantry as they viciously attacked rural elites and peasants from the 
Conservative Party.  However, the bandoleros evolved into an army that specialized in 
paid protection.  Operating mainly in the central coffee belt regions of northern Tolima, 
Valle del Cauca, and Viejo Caldas, they increasingly began to strong-arm coffee 
plantations with forced protection quotas.39  Even more of a threat to the coffee 
landowners was the move by the bandoleros to control and determine coffee production 
in order to ensure their own economic welfare.40   Resistance by the landowners led 
bandoleros to increasingly resort to tactics of extortion and kidnapping.  In the eyes of 
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the Colombian government and outsiders (the United States), the criminal nature of the 
bandoleros was the greatest threat to an end of the violence in the countryside.  
Consequently, the United States used the bandolero threat as well as the more 
"potentially" threatening Communist guerrillas as justification for emergency covert aid 
to Colombia in late 1961.41        
C. THE EARLY HISTORY OF FARC, AND THE "RISE AND FALL" OF 
THE NATIONAL PEASANT ASSOCIATION ANUC (1966 – 1980) 
It was in one of these Liberal guerrilla groups in the department of Tolima that 
future FARC leader and founder, Manuel Marulanda Vélez (a.k.a. Tirofijo or Sure Shot) 
began honing his guerrilla skills.  During La Violencia Liberal peasants with support of 
Communist activists, joined to create peasant self-defense groups in the large coffee 
growing regions of Sumapaz and Taquendama in the Tolima department.42   During the 
early phases of La Violencia these self-defense groups showed little capability or interest 
beyond their own defense from rival peasant groups as Safford and Palacios note in 
Colombia: Fragmented Land, Divided Society (2002):  
They [self-defense organizations] were not given to sabotage or terrorism, 
nor to ambushes of the police or army.  Nor did they defend themselves 
against the state.  They protected peasant communities that obstinately 
cherished rivalries with other peasant communities that were also 
protected by clientilistic armed forces.43
After the general amnesty offered by General Rojas Pinilla in 1953, many of the Liberal 
and Conservative guerrillas alike willingly laid down their arms and gave up their 
struggle.  However, the Communists fighting in Tolima and Cundinamarca, and some 
Liberals including Marulanda, refused to give up their cause.44  In 1955, Rojas Pinilla 
initiated a campaign specifically against these Communist guerrillas.  The end effect was 
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the guerrillas were forced from their "highland" enclaves to the jungles in the Andean 
foothills.45   It was in these jungles that Marulanda joined with Jacobo Arenas, a self-
described "professional revolutionary," and began a community with its own "economic 
self-management and military self-defense," forming the "Independent Republic of 
Marquetalia" in 1961.46   
 In 1962, U.S. military intelligence estimated that eleven "independent republics," 
aided by the PCC, were active with a total force of 1,600 to 2,000 men.47   Although 
"relatively passive," the independent republics were challenging the state’s legitimacy by 
slowly becoming "shadow governments…unresponsive to control from Bogotá."48   
Subsequently, with U.S. training and advisement, the Colombian government initiated an 
aggressive U.S. style counter-insurgency campaign called PLAN LAZO (1964 –1966) 
directed towards both the bandit and communist guerrilla problem.    PLAN LAZO was a 
balanced counter-insurgency/rural pacification plan, incorporating both unconventional 
warfare tactics battle tested in South Vietnam and an important civic action and civic 
self-defense plan focused on winning popular support in contested areas.49    
It was out of PLAN LAZO operations that the Colombian government would 
conduct Operacíon Marquetalia on May 18, 1964 against the "Independent Republic of 
Marquetalia."  The operation used a combined effort of heavy artillery, aerial 
bombardment, and 16,000 infantry in an effort to eliminate Marulanda's guerrilla 
republic.50  However, prior to the operation, Marulanda had evacuated the women, 
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children, and elderly, leaving only 43 guerrillas to fight.51   The armed forces drove 
Marulanda into the mountains of the neighboring "Republic of Chiquito," forcing his 
forces "back to the first stage of mobile guerrilla warfare."52  Nevertheless, in the 
mountains of Cauca, on July 20, 1964, Marulanda with other guerrilla leaders from 
Tolima, Cauca, and Huila regions formed a unified organization called Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionarias de Colombia or FARC.    
In the year immediately following FARC's founding, the guerrilla group operated 
as the "armed wing" (brazo armado) of the PCC conducting ambushes of government 
and police forces all the while trying to avoid their own capture or destruction by an 
increasingly effective government counter-insurgency campaign.   In April 1967 the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) estimated FARC strength at only 500 active forces 
with another 500 members in reserve, spread across traditional strongholds in Tolima and 
in the departments of Quindio, Cauca, Sandander, and Valle.53   Yet by the early 1970s, 
FARC had grown substantially to 5,000 - 8,000 combatants and by the time of the "coca 
boom" of the 1980s FARC numbered 12,000 combatants.54  What can account for 
FARC’s growth prior to the “coca boom” of the 1980s when in the late 1960s the 
guerrilla group appeared to be on the brink of joining other "failed" Latin American 
revolutionary movements?     
Most contemporary studies of FARC begin at Marquetalia and quickly "fast 
forward" to the "coca boom" of the 1980s.55   Yet these types of analysis omit an 
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important period of Colombian history during the late 1960s and early 1970s that saw 
Colombia's peasants organize and mobilize on a national level on a scope that has yet to 
be repeated in modern Colombian history.   Understanding the rise and fall of the 
Asociacíon Nacional de Usuarios Campesinos or ANUC (1970 -1972) is crucial to 
understanding why in the following decades some Colombian peasants, namely landless 
and subsistence farmers not only sought FARC’s protection but also turned to FARC 
believing that no other viable alternative for resolving the land tenure issue existed. 
After La Violencia most of the "grass root" peasant associations that had been 
founded in the 1920s and 1930s had virtually disappeared.56   During the immediate post-
Violencia period, the Lleras administration created committees of Community Action or 
Accion Comunal (AC) under Law 14 of 1958.   Largely conceived as the social side of 
the state's rural pacification efforts, the AC committees were essentially urban and rural 
"neighborhood associations" designed to unify community efforts towards civil 
construction and improvement projects. 57   Central to administration of the AC program 
were community juntas of elected officials who served as the bridge between the 
community's interest and the national government.58    Politically, the juntas served an 
important role reestablishing the state’s presence in those areas particularly decimated 
during La Violencia: 
The partial collapse of state authority in many rural areas during the 
Violencia had left an organizational and power vacuum in many isolated 
rural communities.  The juntas quickly surfaced as centers of partisan 
political activity.  Combined with military actions against the remaining 
guerrilla bands and rural bandits, the AC program helped curtail the power 
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of armed peasant groups while reestablishing effective state and party 
control in many rural areas by the mid-1960's.59  
The AC program posted impressive infrastructure results as "hundreds of bridges, roads, 
water and sewage systems and community centers were built" through the 1960s.60    
Yet by the mid-1960s, a growing frustration in some communities at the 
"favoritism and discontent" associated with the government's funding of AC programs, as 
well as the "slow pace of land reform” led to the radicalization of many rural 
communities.61   Forming AC federations to increase "their collective bargaining power," 
AC juntas combined to "direct challenges to local government officials and to the local 
power structure," and began to threaten the political stability of some rural regions.62   
The radicalization of the AC juntas, the continued rural guerrilla threat, and a stagnant 
rural economy, were all pressing issues as newly elected Liberal President Carlos Lleras 
Restrepo took office in 1966.   Lleras Restrepo’s answer involved not only significant 
land reform but also state-led organization of the peasants via ANUC. 
President Lleras Restrepo’s decision to organize Colombia’s peasants, which was 
almost unthinkable in Latin American elite circles, while also promising a redistributive 
land reform, has received mixed historical interpretations.   Some have characterized 
President Lleras’s administration as truly committed to significant socio-economic 
reforms.    If Lleras were to challenge the status quo, this would require domestic 
pressure from the peasants to overcome resistance by the landowning elite.63    Still 
others have criticized Lleras Restrepo's decision to create ANUC as more self-serving, as 
many believed that he intended to create a popular peasant base of support ensuring his 
reelection in 1974 once the National Front system officially ended.64   This type of 
political strategy had been extremely successful in neighboring Venezuela during the 
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Venezuelan case, government land reform undermined peasant support of leftist 
guerrillas in 1962 and 1963.65   Regardless of President Lleras’s true intentions, in one 
move, by using his presidential power of decrees and avoiding Congressional obstacles, 
he had created a peasant organization that could be controlled by the state as a 
counterweight to the agricultural elites.    
Throughout the Lleras administration, ANUC was “advertised” as an apolitical, 
non-state supported entity.  Yet in reality, nothing could be further from the truth.  In fact 
not only was the Ministry of Agriculture responsible for organizing the peasant usuarios, 
but it was also responsible for training its leaders, registering the peasants, providing 
funding, and creating the Division of Peasant Organization (DOC) within the ministry, 
whose leader was a committee chairman within ANUC.66    Leon Zamosc in The 
Agrarian Question and the Peasant Movement in Colombia (1986) summarizes this 
"unique" relationship that developed between the state and ANUC: 
ANUC's relationship with the state was one of complete dependence on 
both the formal and informal levels…in the strict sense, ANUC was not 
part of the state structure.  Nevertheless, it had an undeniable semiofficial 
status.  Coupled with the pattern of unilateral control, this semiofficial 
status defined ANUC as an extension of the state.67      
The results of the Ministry of Agriculture's efforts were impressive.  By March 1968, 
600,000 peasants were registered members of ANUC, and by October 1971, its 
membership had risen to almost one million.68    
One of the more remarkable accomplishments of ANUC was that early in its 
organizational stage it was able to incorporate both the small landowning peasant and the 
landless peasants.   This was no easy feat as the traditional regionalization and geography 
of Colombia had always contributed to divisions between the two groups. By 1970, 
ANUC had a "national scope, heterogeneous class composition, authentic representation, 
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and institutional legitimating."69     Yet the end of the Lleras administration created a real 
"potential" for crisis within ANUC.   Although the state was now in the position to 
control ANUC, this control hinged upon the state’s ability to "deliver the goods" of land 
reform.     
The positive relationship the Lleras administration had created between the state 
and ANUC began to quickly deteriorate under the Conservative presidency of Misael 
Pastrana (1970-1974).    Although President Pastrana had vowed to continue land reform 
during his campaign, by July 1971, Pastrana had imposed the "indefinite suspension" of 
all INCORA land distributions.  The impetus for Pastrana's "counter-offensive" to turn 
back reforms created during his predecessor's administration had come from the 
landowning elite's growing opposition to ANUC, as the peasant group had become 
increasingly radicalized conducting large-scale land invasions beginning in 1971.    
Repeating an earlier period of landowner and peasant relations, agriculture interest 
groups such as Sociedad de Agricultores de Colombia (SAC) and Federación 
Colombiana de Ganaderos (FEDEGAN) began to campaign against both ANUC and 
Instituto Nacional de Colonización y Reforma Agraria (INCORA) characterizing them as 
ingrained with communist and socialist radical elements.   President Pastrana's campaign 
of “counter-reform,” officially began with the Pact of Chicoral in January 1971, in which 
the government, the Liberal and Conservative Parties, and the "private sector," agreed to 
“roll back" and minimize land reform and to continue to move forward with the 
government's support of "large-scale agricultural production."70   
Continued frustration with the state’s stalled land reform efforts intensified 
ANUC's land invasions to over a thousand in 1972 and 1973 alone.  In 1972, dissension 
within ANUC caused the organization to splinter into multiple groups including ANUC-
Sincelejo, which was the largest and most radical with an estimated 300,000 active 
members.71  By this time, the Pastrana administration began to use the full force of the 
state to end the land invasions through harassment and jailing of the ANUC-Sincelejo 
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leadership.72  This same period saw the emergence of pajaros or hired gunmen, 
“employed by local political bosses and landowners to intimidate or eliminate leaders of 
organizations like ANUC.”73     The state's counter-land reform agenda did not improve 
for the peasants with Liberal candidate Alfonso López Michelsen's election in 1974.   By 
1975, ANUC was almost in a complete downward spiral.  Additionally, by the mid-
1970s, "new occupational alternatives" began to compete with peasant desires for land.   
These included:  (1) a "bonanza" in sugar and coffee production with record prices from 
1975 to 1978; (2) the boom of illicit marijuana cultivation in Colombia; and (3) the 
growth of seasonal labor opportunities in neighboring Venezuela.74  Of these, the 
marijuana industry would have dramatic impact on ANUC's "grass-root" ideology as 
Leon Zamosc writes: 
The fierce land conflicts suddenly ended and were replaced by a vertical 
alignment in which landowners, peasants, and officials shared a common 
interest in the underground economy…paving the way for attitudes and 
values that promoted mafiosi factional loyalties and relegated to the 
background class demands that had originally fed the fighting sprit of the 
grass-roots level.75
However, not all peasants reaped the rewards of the "new occupational 
alternatives."  Despite significant growth in the rural economy in the early 1970s, the 
move to large-scale commercial agricultural production dramatically effected Colombia’s 
subsistent farmers turning millions of peasants into “seasonal migrants.”76   Moreover, 
state repression during the Pastrana and Lopez administrations, paramilitary violence 
against peasant leadership, and the newer phenomenon of marijuana traffickers who 
began using "intimidation and assassination" to gain land for illicit cultivation, all 
contributed towards a growth in FARC as the group "offered to defend local peasant 




74 Zamosc, 202. 
75 Zamosc, 139. 
76 Bagley [e-journal].   
77 Bagley, [e-journal].  The boom in Colombia's marijuana cultivation came as a result of effective  
counter-narcotics efforts in Mexico, who until 1974 was the largest supplier of marijuana to the United 
States.  By 1976 almost two-thirds of the U.S. market for marijuana was being supplied by Colombia. 
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of landless peasants joining FARC was small, the end consequence was “a dramatic 
upsurge in guerrilla violence in the Colombian countryside.”78   
D. THE ESCALATION OF THE RURAL VIOLENCE (1982 – 2002)  
1. A Failed "Cease Fire" and FARC's Embracement of Coca   
The 1980s would prove to be pivotal years for FARC.   The early 1980s can be 
best characterized by the Colombian government’s willingness to negotiate a peace with 
the guerrillas and their re-incorporation back into society.  In 1982, in contrast to his 
predecessor Liberal “hard-liner” Julio Cesar Turbay Ayala (1978-1982), President 
Belisario Bentancur Cuartas initiated the state’s first major attempt to negotiate peace 
with FARC.    Bentancur’s main tool for negotiation was Law 35 (1982), in which he 
promised all guerrillas amnesty, including those in prison.79    Bentancur’s willingness to 
negotiate with FARC, and also the M-19, received harsh criticism from the military, 
leading agriculture producer groups, SAC and FEDEGAN, and from both the Liberal and 
Conservative parties.   Nevertheless, on March 28, 1984, the government and FARC 
agreed to a “cease fire” in which both pledged not to take offensive action against one 
another.80   
This agreement was also politically an important event for FARC, as its 
leadership had been given recognition by the government as “political protagonist,” 
something that eluded them while they where believed to be just the “armed wing” of the 
PCC.81   FARC’s metamorphism into the single most important political and armed actor 
on the left also came as a result of the subsequent and systematic destruction of the Unión 
Patriótica Party (UP).     The government recognized national leftist UP party was 
FARC’s first official effort to enter into Colombia’s “mainstream political system.”82    
Yet from 1984 to 1992 right-wing paramilitaries, funded largely by narco-traffickers, 
were responsible for the assassination of an estimated 3,000 UP members including two 
 
78 Ibid. 
79 Bagley, [e-journal].. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Safford and Palacios, 357.   
82 Crandall, 69. 
56 
                                                
UP Party presidents.83    By 1986, FARC had largely abandoned the UP Party and the 
cease-fire agreement.84   With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990, the PCC lost 
much of its raison d’etre, leaving the ever elusive FARC to fill the void.  What would 
bring FARC back into armed action against the government and others was: (1) the “coca 
boom” of the mid-1980s; (2) the phenomenon of “reverse land reform;” and (3) the rise 
of paramilitary groups funded by narco-baron land entrepreneurs.    
Prior to the 1980s, FARC held coca to be counter to their revolutionary ideology. 
This began to change during the “coca boom” of the early 1980s, when the colonos or 
subsistent farmers that lived in FARC controlled territory found it hard to resist growing 
a crop that needed no fertilizer or pesticides, and most importantly, provided five to ten 
percent more profit than any legitimate crop they could grow.85   Thus from the FARC’s 
perspective, to turn their back on the peasants who were involved in the cultivation or 
processing of coca would be to give up not only territory to narco-traffickers, but also 
control over FARC's small but significant peasant base of power.    To justify their 
acknowledgement of the coca trade within traditional Marxism, FARC argued “they were 
stubbornly fighting for farm wages higher than those the drug cartels were offering."86   
Consequently FARC not only "began to promote and protect the coca crop themselves," 
but also imposed a seven to ten percent tax or gramaje on the market price of each kilo of 
cocaine.87    
Three factors during the 1990s led to an increased involvement of the FARC in 
the drug trade.    First, aggressive U.S. supported eradication and interdiction efforts in 
both Peru and Bolivia caused a significant drop in coca cultivation within these two 
countries, yet caused a virtual "bumper crop" of coca cultivation in Colombia (Figure 2).   
Up until the mid-1990s, Colombia only produced twenty-five percent of the coca base 
produced in the Andes.   By the late 1990s, coca cultivation as well as the laboratories 
 
83 Otis, John. "Fighting Among Themselves."  Houston Chronicle, 03 August 2001, 
http://www.chron.com/cs/CDA/story.hts/special/rebelheld/986658  [12 Nov 2003]. 
84 Crandall, 69. 
85 Molano, “The evolution of the FARC: A guerrilla group's long history.” [Electronic version]. 
86 Laqueur, Walter.  The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction.  (Oxford 
University Press: Oxford, 1999), 213.   
87 Ibid. 
used to produce coca paste had largely shifted from Bolivia and Peru to Colombia, 
locating in the same remote areas where the guerrillas had operated for decades, namely 
in Putumayo, Guaviare, and Caqueta.88  Second, beginning in 1991 the Colombian  
 










Source:  U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA).  The Drug Trade in Colombia.  (DEA 
 Intelligence Division, March 2002).     
 
government began major market reforms called la apertura.   Although intended to 
“reinvigorate the agricultural sector and promote private sector involvement” as well as 
create access to “export markets that had remained underdeveloped as a result of import-
substituting policies (ISI),” other factors such as a drop in international agriculture 
commodities and a devastating drought in 1992, all led to an agricultural crisis between 
1990 and 1994.89    Third, a U.S. and Colombia “kingpin strategy” was successful in 
“bringing down” the leadership of the Medellín and Cali drug cartels.   This had the 
                                                 
88 U.S. Department of Justice. DEA.  "The Drug Trade in Colombia." Home page on-line.  Intelligence 
Division, March 2002) available from http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/intel/02006/index.htm  (accessed on 
10 Oct 2003). The U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) notes that the close proximity of laboratories to 
coca fields is common sense, "Considering that approximately 1 metric ton of fresh coca leaf is required to 
produce 1 kilogram of cocaine base."   
89 Brizzi, Adolfo, Natalia Gomez, and Matthew McMahon.  “Agriculture and Rural Development.”  In 
Colombia the Economic Foundation of Peace, ed. Marcelo M. Giugale et al.   (World Bank: New York, 
2003), 489. 
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effect of creating a “leadership and logistical” vacuum in which FARC and other 
decentralized organizations readily filled the void.90   This factor, as well as the decline 
of the rural sector and the significant increase of illicit coca cultivation in Colombia 
would create the necessary conditions for a major escalation in the rural violence 
beginning in the late-1990s (Figure 4).     















Source:  Socio-political deaths include political homicide, forced disappearance, homicide of social marginals, and 
battle related deaths.  1988-2000 data taken from Comisión Colombiana de Juristas data in Pedro Valenzuela, 
"Reflections on recent interpretations of violence in Colombia." [Electronic version] In Breeding Inequality-Reaping 
Violence: Exploring linkages and causality in Colombia and beyond," ed. By Anders Rudqvist, (Collegium for 
Development Studies: Uppsala, Sweden, 2002) available from 
http://www.kus.uu.se/poverty&violence/PovertyViolence.pdf 2001-2002 data taken from Comisión Colombiana de 
Juristas, "Alerta Frente a las Cifras Gubernamentales Sobre Derechos Humanos en Colombia” (July 2003) 
http://ciponline.org/colombia/030709ccj.htm  
 
2. The Conflict's "Center of Gravity," By the Numbers 
 An overview of the plethora of literature written on the contemporary conflict 
would find that in regards to coca and poppy cultivation we have accurate data on the 
amount of land under illicit cultivation (Figure 3).  What is not well known is just how 
many Colombians work directly in coca or poppy cultivation or production.   In 1999, it 
was estimated that over 250,000 Colombian families worked with illicit coca and poppy 
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crops.91  Defining a median size household as 4.26 persons, this would put approximately 
1.07 million Colombians working with the cultivation or processing of coca or poppy.92  
Of a total rural population of 12.7 million, this “illicit” segment accounts for less than ten 
percent of the rural population.  Furthermore, of the estimated 250,000 families, it is 
known that by March 2003, USAID alternative development projects in Colombia were 
benefiting some 22,800 families.93   Historically, lack of security is one of the prime 
obstacles for effective alternative development programs, so we will further assume that 
these 22,800 families are in areas where a minimum of state security exist (i.e., are not 
controlled by guerillas or paramilitaries). This would place a possible 227,200 families or 
approximately 967,872 Colombians in FARC, ELN, or paramilitary controlled territory.   
From a Clausewitzian perspective, these 227,200 Colombian families should represent 
the center of gravity for policymakers endeavoring to resolve the rural conflict.    
Figure 5:    Colombia: Coca cultivation in hectares, 1994 - 2002 
 
  Source:   United Nations. Office on Drugs and Crime. (17 March 2003).       
  http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/press_release_2003-03-17_1.html . 
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Peasants living in these areas have essentially three options:  (1) they can leave; 
(2) they can resist and possibly be killed; or (3) they can choose to join or at a minimum 
support the guerrillas or paramilitaries.  Evidence supports that this first option is the 
option of choice as data demonstrates Colombia’s “internally displaced population” (IDP) 
has risen dramatically from an estimated 27,000 internally displaced in 1985 to 341,925 
internally displaced in 2001, bringing the total internally displaced population to 2.5 
million.94  A 2001 report showed 46 percent of the forced displacements were caused by 
paramilitaries, 12 percent by the FARC or ELN, and 19 percent by “other parties,” 
although in 2002 there appears to be a significant rise of FARC initiated forced 
displacements.95  The second option for peasants, which is to resist paramilitary or 
guerrilla forces, is often a death sentence as both groups have shown a willingness to 
murder innocent civilians.96   The final option available to peasants is to join, support, or 
submit to guerrilla control, in other words mobilize.    This option to mobilize may prove 
just as dangerous as option two, as by supporting FARC, peasants put themselves and 
families in harms way by either paramilitary or state forces.   What are the possible 
explanations for this?   
In the case of those peasants living and working under FARC control, one 
possible answer to understanding why peasants would potentially “risk everything” is   
explained by James Scott’s theory of subsistence and peasant rebellion.   Scott argued 
that the overriding “moral principle” of peasant societies is their “right to subsistence.”97   
If peasants believe their right to subsistence is in danger, they will rebel and “take up 
arms less often to destroy elites than to compel them to meet their moral obligations.”98   
The "subsistence theory" has shown to be important in explaining some Latin American 
 
94 Arboleda, Jairo and Elena Correa.  “Forced Internal Displacement.”  In Colombia the Economic 
Foundation of Peace, ed. Marcelo M. Giugale et al.   (World Bank: New York, 2003), 830. 
95 Arboleda and Correa, 829. 
96 Human Rights Watch.  “Colombia: Terror From all sides.” [Electronic Version] HRW: America’s 
Division, (24 April 2002) available from http://hrw.org/backgrounder/americas/colombia-table.pdf 
(accessed on 5 November 2003).  In 2001, Human Rights Watch reported 197 civilian deaths were 
responsible to FARC and 1,015 civilian murders were carried out by the AUC.   
97 Scott, James C. The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia.   
(Yale University Press:  New Haven, 1976), 6. 
98 Scott, 192.   
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cases of peasant revolt, specifically Sendero Luminoso or Shining Path in Peru.  In the 
Peruvian case, Cynthia McClintock found that an increase in population size, land 
exhaustion, and ill-advised government agricultural policies, all contributed to a crisis in 
subsistence for Peru's highland peasants.99   The regions where a "subsistence crisis" 
existed also correlated to strong Sendero Luminoso support, specifically in the Ayacucho 
area.100   Yet in the Colombian case, while poverty and extreme poverty levels were 
extremely high during the 1970s, helping to possibly explain the rise of peasant support 
for FARC in the early 1980s, the evidence does not support a similar "subsistence crisis" 
experienced by Colombia’s peasants during the 1990s.   What may be more of a cause of 
peasant resistance or rebellion in Colombia is both the significant increase in inequality 
of income and land ownership since the mid-1990s.  
E.  MAKING THE CONNECTION: INEQUALITY, REVERSE LAND 
REFORM, AND SOCIO-POLITICAL VIOLENCE 
1. Poverty Lessens but Inequality Rises (1978 -1999) 
Over the past two decades, Colombia made significant strides in reducing both 
rural and urban poverty.   Between 1978 and 1988, rural poverty dropped 14 percentage 
points and 20 percentage points for extreme rural poverty.101   During this same time 
period the $2.00 (U.S.)/day poverty rate was reduced 50 percentage points.102  Even 
during the 1995 to 1999 period that saw a significant rise in rural violence, poverty 
levels, although still high, were rather stable (Table 2).   Yet what did worsen during the 
1995 to 1999 period was inequality in both rural income and the concentration of rural 
landownership.   Recalling Muller and Seligson’s (1987) hypothesis that "inequality in 
the distribution of income" is a better explanation of political violence and insurgency 
than inequality of landownership, they did however acknowledge that inequality in 
 
99 McClintock, 63. 
100 McClintock, 49. 
101 World Bank.  "Colombia Poverty Report: Vol. I."   (World Bank: Washington, D.C, 2002), p. 11. 
[Electronic version]  available from 
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aedfe85256ba300696faa/$FILE/Chapter%205,%20References%20(446KB).pdf (accessed on 13 Nov 
2003). Poverty is based on the poverty line, which represents the “cutoff points separating the poor from the 
nonpoor.”  The extreme poverty line, which in this case is calculated by the Colombian Statistical Agency 
DANE, calculates “the minimum calorie and nutrient requirement of individuals of average age and sex”  
(p. 11).  
102 Ibid. 
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landownership becomes an important variable in the presence of income inequality.103   
In the Colombian case, it appears the simultaneous increase in both of these variables has 
contributed to the rise in rural violence during the 1990s.     
By the end of the 1970s, Colombia had experienced over two decades of a steady 
reduction in income inequality, and appeared to be a "model" example of the well-known 
"Kuznet's Curve."104   Yet by the 1980s, reduction in income inequality levels in 
Colombia began to "plateau," leading to only modest decreases through 1988 to 1995 
(Table 3).105   By 1999, Colombia's level of income inequality was greater than 94 
percent of the world's population, having “jumped almost 6 percentage points in its Gini 
coefficient, well above the previous high reached in 1988" (Figure 6).106     Most 
significantly, table 3 shows that rural income inequality was worse in 1999 than 1978.      
Some of the contributing factors that drove the rural economy to this level of inequality 
were: (1) after effects of the failed la apertura; (2) an expansion of the world coffee 
market and a significant drop in international coffee prices; (3) lack of investor 
confidence in the agricultural sector due to continuing rural insecurity; (4) the continued 
misuse of arable land for cattle pasturing vice traditional crop cultivation; and (5) the 
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Table 2. Poverty Indicators, National, Urban, and Rural Colombia 1978-99 
 
Source: World Bank. 2002. Colombia Poverty Report: Ch. 1, p. 12. 
While income inequality contributed to the rural violence during the 1990s, an 
equally significant trend during this period was the increase of concentration of land 
ownership in Colombia.   As figures 7 and 8 illustrate, the concentration of 
landownership in Colombia has progressively worsened since the 1960s.     From 1960 to 
1997, the percentage of small farms (less than 100 hectares) owned by the overwhelming 
percentage of total landowners stayed relatively the same.  Yet this same period saw a 
dramatic decrease in medium sized land holdings and an increase in large land holdings.   
In 1960 5% of all landowners held 29.1% of the total land available.      By 1997, 3% of 
all landowners owned an incredible 45% of the total amount of land available in 
Colombia.    The main cause of the high level of inequality in landownership stems from 












         Source:   World Bank. 2002.  Colombia Poverty Report: Ch. 1, p. 14. 
Figure 6:   Comparison of Inequality in Colombia in international context 
 
















Distribution of land holdings in Hectares
<100 Ha 40.6 40 34.5
100-500 Ha 30.3 27.5 20.5




Source:   1960 data taken from Review of  Colombia’s agriculture and rural development 
strategy. (World Bank Country Study 1996)  1984 and 1997 data taken from Isabel 
Lavadenz, and Klaus Deininger. “Land Policy,” in Maarcelo M. Giugale, Olivier 
Lafourcade, and Connie Luff ed.  Colombia: The Economic Foundations of Peace 
(World Bank, 2003).   
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% of total landowners
Concentration of land ownership 
<100 96.7 96.9 97.4
100-500 2.8 2.7 2.3




Source:   1960 data taken from Review of  Colombia’s agriculture and rural development 
strategy. (World Bank Country Study 1996)  1984 and 1997 data taken from Isabel 
Lavadenz, and Klaus Deininger. “Land Policy,” in Maarcelo M. Giugale, Olivier 
Lafourcade, and Connie Luff ed.  Colombia: The Economic Foundations of Peace 
(World Bank, 2003).   
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2. The Scope of the "Reverse Land Reform" Problem 
Until only recently, the only reliable estimate of the scope of the "reverse land 
reform" problem was reported by the United Nations, which estimated narco-traffickers 
owned 4.4 million hectares with an estimated worth of 2.4 billion dollars.107   In 
September 2003, these numbers were confirmed by Colombia's Comptroller General's 
Office which reported 48 percent of Colombia's most "productive land," is owned by 
narco-traffickers.108   Figure 9 illustrates the prevalence of the “reverse land reform” 
problem, as a 1997 study found 399 municipalities were targets of narco-trafficker land 
purchases.109   Yet the number of hectares actually owned by narco-traffickers may be 
even higher than the above estimates.    Much of the land purchased by narco-traffickers 
was done so “legitimately” by using "offshore banks and other international financial 
institutions” creating an enormous problem for Colombia’s already taxed judicial system 
to prove these land purchases were illegal.110     
Based on substantial research conducted by Alejandro Reyes in 1997, there is 
significant correlation between land concentration (specifically that land purchased by 
narco-traffickers), FARC attacks, paramilitary attacks, and massacres.   Figure 10 
illustrates the location and rate of occurrence of FARC attacks from 1995 to 1997.   
Figure 11 shows both guerrilla and paramilitary activity, and most importantly shows 
were these two groups overlap in contested regions.   Figure 12 is a 2001 map showing 
the occurrences and intensity of massacres and disappearances in Colombia.   While not 
all of the rural violence occurs in areas of high land concentration, these maps clearly 
illustrate that the correlation between land and conflict is high in Colombia.    
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Editores PNUD, DNE y Ariel Ciencia Política. Santafé de Bogotá D.C., May, 1997. 
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Figure 9:   Colombia, Land Purchased by Narco-traffickers 
 
Source:  Reyes, Alejandro.  “Compras de tierras por narcotraficantes” in Drogas Ilícitas en Colombia, 
Editores PNUD, DNE y Ariel Ciencia Política. Santafé de Bogotá D.C., May, 1997. Summary of report 
available from http://www.disaster.info.desastres.net/desplazados/geografia/antinarcoticos.htm [accessed 





Figure 10: Colombia,  FARC Military Actions (1995 - 1997)  
 
 
Source:  Reyes, Alejandro.  “Compras de tierras por narcotraficantes” in Drogas Ilícitas en 
Colombia, Editores PNUD, DNE y Ariel Ciencia Política. Santafé de Bogotá D.C., May, 1997. 
Summary of report available from  









Source:  Reyes, Alejandro.  “Compras de tierras por narcotraficantes” in Drogas Ilícitas en Colombia, 
Editores PNUD, DNE y Ariel Ciencia Política. Santafé de Bogotá D.C., May, 1997. Summary of report 
available from http://www.disaster.info.desastres.net/desplazados/geografia/paramilitarismo.htm
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F. CONCLUSION 
This chapter began with the premise that conflict in rural Colombia has long been 
linked to disputes over land.   The historical analysis of this chapter confirms that indeed 
land or rather lack of land tenure has historically been a source of conflict between 
landowners and peasants, specifically the landless peasant or colono.    This chapter also 
shows that throughout the 20th century Colombia's peasants have had difficulty 
influencing national land policies.  Even when Colombia's peasants were able to mobilize 
at a significant level and had the backing of the president, the more politically powerful 
agricultural elites were able to reverse or stymie favorable peasant land legislation.    The 
important case of ANUC that receives little attention in contemporary scholarship drives 
home this point.    
The final portion of this chapter concentrated on understanding the current wave 
of peasant resistance.  This resistance does not necessarily mean armed resistance, but 
also resistance that includes the decision by peasants to grow illicit crops in guerrilla- 
held territories and support directly or indirectly FARC’s armed activities.  Concentrating 
on a potential 227,000 Colombian families that constitute the “center of gravity” in the 
rural conflict, there is evidence that two factors have greatly influenced Colombia’s 
peasants' decision to resist beginning in the mid-1990s:  (1) an increase in income 
inequality; and (2) the simultaneous increase in the inequality of land ownership.    Social 
science theories of peasant revolution have shown that in many cases one of these factors 
has been sufficient alone to cause an increase in political violence or insurrection.   In the 
Colombian case, the presence of both factors has contributed to the levels of violence 
seen since the mid to late-1990s.   The next chapter will examine whether land reform is 
likely to contribute to the resolution of rural conflict and, if so, the political feasibility of 
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IV. THE FEASIBILITY OF LAND REFORM IN COLOMBIA 
I have never seen a country involved in an internal conflict in which the 
position of simply eliminating the "enemy" -- without making concessions, 
without in-depth political and social changes, without making real economic 
sacrifices - ever resolved their conflict...It [land reform] is among the main 
issues that might considerably influence political and social solutions and 
make this [Colombia] a better country.  —UN, Acting Special Adviser on 
Colombia, James Lemoyne (September, 2003)  
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter examined the merits of the land reform hypothesis as 
applied to Colombia.  The analysis showed that a historical based land conflict between 
large landowners and peasants has evolved to include insurgents and narco-traffickers.   
The previous chapter also illustrated that while it is unclear exactly how much of the 
current rural violence can be directly attributed to the conflict over land, two factors, 
inequality of landownership and inequality of rural income, appear to be important 
contributors to the rural conflict.    This chapter focuses on the feasibility of land reform 
in Colombia today by addressing four central questions: (1) If land reform is to be a 
possible solution to the rural conflict, exactly what type of land reform is to be 
implemented?  (2) What are the institutional obstacles that Colombia’s president must 
overcome to implement land reform?  (3) If land reform is to be implemented in 
Colombia, what actors have the most to lose and would oppose a redistributive land 
reform policy?  And (4) what role does Colombia’s asset forfeiture law have in 
implementing a legally based expropriative type of land reform?    
B.    DEFINING LAND REFORM 
Many who advocate land reform as a possible solution to Colombia's rural 
conflict refer to land reform in almost "blanket-like" terms without first defining exactly 
what type of land reform policy they are advocating.   As this section will show, how 
policy makers define land reform has significant ramifications in the policy 
implementation.   In the Cold War era, land reform commonly was defined in terms of 
the “redistribution of property rights.”   Frequently, this meant the state’s outright 
“confiscation” or “expropriation” of land and its subsequent “redistribution” to small 
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farmers, sharecroppers, or landless peasants.    Huntington provides an even more 
succinct definition of this type of land reform, “Land reform means the forceful taking 
away of property from one group of people and giving it to another.”1   However, land 
reform based on expropriation, specifically without compensation, is also the most 
controversial, and potentially the one type most likely to instigate political unrest “from 
above” or “from below” (e.g., Guatemala 1954, El Salvador 1980).     
Today, many land reform experts acknowledge the political controversy and 
difficulties associated with “expropriation” based land reforms, and now propose more 
relaxed definitions that concentrate on “land access.”    Roy Prosterman and Tim Hanstad 
(2003) recently defined land reform as, “Reforms that increase the ability of the rural 
poor and other socially excluded groups to gain access to land and to exercise effective 
control over the land.”2   Prosterman and Hanstad’s definition of land reform may have 
particular pertinence in the Colombian case.  Their definition allows for a wide-degree of 
variance in just how “land access” will be obtained.  It does not advocate expropriative 
type of land reform, but on the other hand it does not rule out its usage when required.  
Their definition also recognizes a well-know fact in land reform case studies:  the long-
term success or failure of land reform depends upon the existence of a land reform 
infrastructure to support new land reform recipients. This can include:  incorporating land 
reform into an overall rural development plan; training and technical assistance; access to 
markets; formalized property rights; and access to credit.3   Without this type of capital 
intensive supporting infrastructure, increasing agriculture production for new landowners 
is very difficult, and in the case of Peru (1968-1980), its absence became a source of 
peasant rebellion after the initial distribution of land by the government.     
Just as defining land reform is crucial for the reformer, equally challenging is 
defining just what the political, social, or economic objectives of land reform policy will 
 
1 Huntington, 385.   
2 Prosterman, Roy L.  and Tim Hanstad.  “Land Reform in the 21st Century:  New Challenges, New 
Responses.”   Rural Development Institute (RDI) Reports on Foreign Aid and Development, No. 117, 
(Mar., 2003) Available [On-line] http://www.rdiland.org/PDF/PDF_Reports/RDI_117.pdf (Accessed 15 
Nov 2003).   
3 Deininger, Klaus.  Land policies for growth and poverty reduction.  (World Bank and Oxford 
University Press, 2003).  Available [On-line].   http://econ.worldbank.org/prr/land_policy/text-27809/ 
(Accessed 01 Sept 2003). 
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be.    Throughout the Cold War era, states that chose land reform tended to do so for 
political and social reasons.    This is confirmed in my analysis of both the South Vietnam 
and El Salvador cases where little importance was placed on “converting the landless into 
successful agricultural entrepreneurs.”4   Even in post-war Japan, which is arguably the 
most successful case of land reform in the 20th century, the focus was on redistribution 
and redefining social classes, not on modes of production.5    Yet from an economic 
perspective, political or social objective types of land reform can be fatally flawed, as 
Klaus Deininger writes: 
Instead of aiming to increase productivity and reduce poverty, the main 
goal of many land reforms in the past has been to calm social unrest and 
allay political pressures by peasant organizations.  Such reforms had often 
been initiated in response to political pressure rather than as part of a long-
term rural development strategy.  The resulting reform measures were 
generally designed ad hoc bore little relation to actual needs on the 
ground, and commitment to them faltered once social emergencies had 
subsided.6    
By the mid-1980s expropriative types of land reform were quickly “falling from 
grace” among the world’s policymakers.   The collapse of the Soviet Union radically 
removed the ideological motives that many had placed on land reform in larger strategies 
of counter-insurgency.    Additionally, the United States, the premier advocate of land 
reform throughout many parts of the world, was in transition from defeating Communism 
to supporting democratization, human rights, and free-market reforms throughout the 
world.7   Lastly, developmental agencies, such as the World Bank, which in the past had 
 
4 Deininger, “Making Negotiated Land Reform Work,” 9. 
5 Kawagoe, Toshihiko.  “Agricultural land reform in postwar Japan: Experiences and Issues.”   World 
Bank Policy Working Research Papers No. 2111 (May 1999), 36. Available [On-line]. 
http://www.worldbank.org/html/dec/Publications/Workpapers/wps2000series/wps2111/wps2111.pdf 
[Accessed 11 Oct 2003].   
6 Deininger, Klaus.  “Making Negotiated Land Reform Work: Initial experience from Colombia, 
Brazil, and South Africa.”  World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2040 (Jan., 1999). Available [On-
line]. http://www.worldbank.org/html/dec/Publications/Workpapers/wps2000series/wps2040/wps2040.pdf 
[Accessed 22 September 2003].  
7 Herring, Ronald J.   “Political Conditions for Agrarian Reform and Poverty Alleviation.”  Paper 
presented at 2001 World Development Report on Poverty, Birmingham, England, 17 August 1999, 2. 
Available [On-line] http://www.worldbank.org/poverty/wdrpoverty/dfid/herring.pdf  (Accessed 11 Oct 
2003). 
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recognized the developmental potential of land reform, by the 1980s, began advocating 
“market solutions” for reducing poverty, in contrast to redistribution.8     
Yet by the mid-1990s, it was becoming apparent that structural adjustments or 
neo-liberal reforms of the late 1980s and early 1990s had little positive effect on 
inequality in developing countries.   Consequently, economists have now recognized that 
in many countries (e.g. Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala, and South Africa list 
alphabetically) poor access to “land markets” plays a significant role in exacerbating rural 
poverty and inequality.  Today, agencies such as the World Bank now advocate what has 
been called  “negotiated land reform.”    This type of land reform: 
Relies on voluntary land transfers based on negotiation between buyers 
and sellers, where the government’s role is restricted to establishing the 
necessary framework and making available a land purchase grant to 
eligible beneficiaries.9    
However results from pilot programs in Brazil, Colombia, and South Africa, showed that 
“negotiated” transfers of land have still ultimately been hampered by the lack of the 
aforementioned infrastructure necessary to support new landowner productivity.  
Regardless of what type of land reform policy is implemented an effective infrastructure 
is crucial for long-term viability.     
C.       THE POLITICAL FEASIBILITY OF LAND REFORM IN COLOMBIA   
As the previous chapter illustrated, land reform, specifically redistributive land 
reform, is a difficult policy item not only to initiate in Colombia, but just as difficult to 
implement.  This section concentrates on the political feasibility of redistributive land 
reform in Colombia by examining four central actors:  the Colombian president; the 
Colombian congress; agricultural producer interest groups; and the Colombian land 
reform agency INCORA.   This section will show: (1) Colombia’s political institutions 
are not favorable for Colombia’s president to gain support for redistributive land reform; 
(2) agricultural producers, specifically the livestock industry have a vested interest in 
opposing a redistributive land reform policy; (3) even if the president was able to gain a 
 
8 Ibid. 
9 Deininger, Klaus.  “Making Negotiated Land Reform Work,” 3. 
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consensus for a redistributive policy, its implementation would be likely hindered by the 
bureaucracy and poor administration of INCORA.       
1.    The President as Reformer in Colombia 
It is not an understatement that any “expropriative” type of land reform 
historically has and will continue to be a difficult policy item for Colombia’s presidents 
to implement.    For any reform to happen in Colombia, not only does the president have 
to have “political will” to take on such a policy, but the president must, as Huntington 
(1968) notes, have the “political talent” to make land reform a reality.10 Even with these 
two qualities, Colombia’s presidents who attempt to implement an expropriative land 
reform agenda, must be able to overcome: (1) a highly “clientilistic” legislature; and (2) 
well organized agricultural producer groups or gremios.    These two groups have 
traditionally opposed expropriative types of land reform in Colombia.   Recalling the 
presidency of Lleras Restrepo, it was these very factors that led him to organize ANUC, 
fully aware that without significant social pressure “from below,” land reform policy 
would be extremely difficult to implement.   With the possibilities of a reemergence of 
ANUC on the scale of the early 1970s unlikely, what institutional options are available 
for presidents choosing the difficult path of expropriative land reform?   
2.   Could Emergency Powers of Decree Be Used for Expropriative Land 
Reform?  
From a distance Colombia appears to have a strong system of “presidentialism.”  
Some have even characterized Colombia’s presidents as a virtual “demigod.”11   Prior to 
the creation of the 1991 Constitution, Colombia’s presidents were able to bypass 
Congressional “roadblocks” through their unique powers of presidential decrees.     The 
ability to legislate by decree allowed presidents to essentially "establish a new status quo" 
each time they issued a decree.12    Within the constitutional guidelines that existed prior 
to 1991, presidents could use their emergency powers to "suspend but not abolish 
existing laws and to emit decrees with the force of law," all with the purpose of "restoring 
 
10 Huntington, 345.    
11 Mainwaring, Scott and Matthew S. Shugart.  Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America.  
(Cambridge University Press:  1997), 118. 
12 Shugart and Mainwaring, 44. 
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order."13   This was a powerful tool for Colombia’s presidents as congress “could not 
rescind or modify (the decree), short of a constitutional amendment.”14   
The frequency with which Colombia’s presidents used emergency powers of 
decree was significant.    From 1958 to 1991, Colombian presidents declared the country 
under a "state of siege" 75 percent of the time.15     Throughout this period, Colombia’s 
presidents used their emergency powers to "attack economic as well as political causes of 
public disorder," making this an effective means to overcome congressional "inefficiency 
and immobilism."16  What made the president’s emergency powers even more potent was 
that subsequent to 1991, emergency decrees could legally last as long as the “state of 
siege” existed.  Consequently, Colombia’s presidents routinely would not lift the “state of 
siege” until legislators had made their decrees into law.   Yet after the ratification of the 
1991 Constitution, the president is now limited to only a 90 day period of a “state of 
siege,” with a maximum of one 90 day extension upon Senate approval.17   Consequently, 
in light of the 1991 Constitution, any hopes of implementing long-term land reform via 
emergency decrees are not feasible for Colombia’s presidents.   When Colombia’s 
presidents have found their reform policies halted in Congress, their only route has been 
to "rely on ad hoc deals with power brokers who demand patronage in exchange for 
supporting policies desired by the President."18    
3.  Congress as an Obstacle to Land Reform  
If Colombia’s presidents cannot turn to their limited decree power to implement 
expropriative land reform, what is the feasibility that policy implementation can come 
from within the legislature?    Many scholars have characterized Colombia’s legislature 
as being inherently “weak” due to its “clientilistic” nature.   In this clientilistic party 
system, Colombia’s legislators are more loyal to their individual constituents than to their 
own party’s national leadership or to programmatic pledges (like land reform) made 
 
13 Archer and Shugart, 126. 
14 Archer and Shugart, 123. 
15 Ibid.   
16 Archer and Shugart, 127.   
17 Archer and Shugart, 128.   
18 Archer and Shugart, 111. 
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during campaigns.   This has two important implications for reform policy:  (1) 
Colombia’s Congress is not “an important arena for the creation of national policy;” and 
(2) it is very difficult for Colombia’s presidents to gain a coalition to support a national 
reform when they are unable to depend on their own party’s loyalty.19       
4.   The Power of Gremios  
The power of interest or lobby groups in the United States and their ability to 
influence public policy, especially at the legislative level are well known.  However, in 
the Colombian case, agricultural producer groups or gremios, have shown to be less 
influential in the actual policymaking process, and rather have exerted their influence to 
impede policy implementation that is not in their economic interest.20     In the case of 
land reform, two gremios, the Farmers Association of Colombia (SAC) and the 
Federation of Cattle Ranchers (Federación Colombiana de Ganaderos or FEDEGAN) 
have traditionally sought to “derail” distributive types of land reform policy.   Recall that 
in 1968 President Lleras Restrepo attempted to implement a redistributive land reform 
under Law I of 1968.    The negative reaction by both SAC and FEDEGAN and the 
political pressure exerted on the successor Pastrana administration resulted in a stoppage 
of all INCORA redistributions in 1971, as well as the passage of new pro-landowner 
legislation.   Indicative of this time period, Jonathan Hartlyn writes: 
Numerous congressmen have had extensive ties with agricultural and 
livestock associations, and landed interests have more readily employed 
congressmen to apply political pressure on the executive branch than have 
other producer groups.21
Unlike U.S. interest groups, which concentrate on the legislature, Colombia’s gremios   
direct the majority of their efforts towards the ministries and economic team within the 
presidential administration.22  This is owed to the aforementioned inadequacy of 
Colombia’s legislature in making public policy.   Consequently, the “maintenance of 
 
19 Archer and Shugart, 132.   
20 Hartlyn, Jonathan.  “Producer Associations, the Political Regime, and Policy Processes in 
Contemporary Colombia.”  [Electronic version] Latin American Research Review 20.3 (1985), 122. 
21 Hartlyn, 123.   
22 Thor Hagen, Jason.  “Agrarian Interest in a Liberalizing Economy:  Colombia’s Law 101 of 1993.”  
Paper presented at Latin American Studies Association meeting Guadalajara, Mexico, 17 April 1997, 10.  
Available from http://136.142.158.105/LASA97/thorhagen.pdf (Accessed on 21 September 2003).   
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personal allegiances” within the administration is extremely important for gremios 
wishing to influence policy in one way or another.23    
While much of the “lobbying” of SAC and FEDEGAN is related to micro and 
macro level economic policy, these groups have also showed a willingness to interject 
their influence into matters of domestic security.    During attempts by the Bentancur 
administration to broker a negotiated settlement with FARC during the early 1980s, part 
of the reason that President Bentancur could not gain congressional support for his 
concessionary political reforms, even from his own Conservative Party, stemmed from 
SAC and FEDEGAN’s staunch opposition to President Bentancur’s “soft line” approach 
with the guerrillas.24   As rural Colombia became increasingly violent following the 
breakdown of the 1984 “cease fire” accords, SAC and FEDEGAN became increasingly 
active participants in the conflict.      Of the these two groups, it has been FEDEGAN that 
has taken a “hard line” approach to the conflict, advocating and supporting a military 
solution, albeit at times, a paramilitary solution to the guerrilla problem.   As I will 
discuss, although there were indications that FEDEGAN was amendable to redistributive 
land reform during the late 1990s, today all indications are that they oppose making land 
reform concessions with the guerrillas.     
One reason the cattle industry became such a frequent target of FARC rent 
seeking activities was that the industry has such a disproportionate presence in the rural 
economy compared to more traditional crop farming.    The preeminence of the cattle 
industry in rural Colombia came as a result of the process of ganaderización, or the 
conversion of arable cropland to grazing pastures for livestock.   Beginning after the 
Violencia period,  ganaderización contributed not only to rural unemployment, as cattle 
ranching requires minimal labor, but also deprived “the rural economy of its growth 
potential…preclud[ing] Colombia from realizing its comparative advantage in labor-
intensive fruits and other high-value crops.”25   As table 1 illustrates, from 1985 through 
1999 saw a dramatic decrease in land utilized for traditional crop production, and an 
 
23 Thor Hagen, 11. 
24 Bagley, [On-line version]. 
25 Lavadenz and Deininger, 564. 
equally significant rise in land used for cattle ranching.   Contributing factors to this 
process have been not only reverse land reform, but also the fact that rural insecurity has 
caused many small farmers to abandon or sell their lands, and large agricultural producers 

















Table 4. Land Use in Colombia, 1985 - 1999 
 
 
Keeping the ganaderización process in mind, we find that the cattle ranching 
interest that FEDEGAN represents are significant.  With a membership base of 300,000 
cattle ranchers, who own a combined 26 million hectares of land, Colombia’s cattle 
ranchers have been on the “frontline” in Colombia’s rural conflict.  In 2002, based on 
FEDEGAN’s own account, the rural violence cost FEDEGAN members the following:        
Source:  Lavadenz, and Klaus Deininger. “Land Policy,” in Marcelo M. Giugale, Olivier Lafourcade, and 
Connie Luff ed.  Colombia: The Economic Foundations of Peace (World Bank, 2003). 
• 353 cattle ranchers kidnapped  
• Total cost of extortion $62 million  (COL) 
• 77,600 head of cattle stolen  
81 
82 
                                                
• Total cost of rural conflict on cattle industry $388 million (COL)26 
Yet while FEDEGAN members have been frequent targets of guerrilla violence, many 
have noted that it has been Colombia’s cattle ranchers who have also contributed to the 
perpetuation of the rural conflict.   
 Faced with an increasingly coercive guerrilla presence, which demanded 
“protection” taxes to prevent kidnappings and cattle theft, cattle ranchers aided by narco-
traffickers turned landowners, began to support or even create their own paramilitary 
armies during the 1990s.27     Using paramilitaries, some cattle ranchers also attempted to 
evict colonos and retake territory previously lost to the guerrillas.28    Furthermore, as 
narco-traffickers joined the ranks of legitimate cattle ranchers after laundering their drug 
profits into land, Nazih Richani writes, “Local branches of FEDEGAN in the Middle 
Magdalena, Cesar, Bolivar, Santander, and Cordoba among others are penetrated heavily 
by narco-traffickers.”29       What makes the cattle industry even further resistant to a 
redistributive land reform policy is that following la apertura, the cattle industry believed 
that they “did not reap any economic benefit” from the market reforms.30  Prior to la 
apertura, Colombia’s livestock industry had been afforded special protection measures 
over traditional crop farming.   The period from 1980 to 1992 saw both beef and milk 
“absorb 82% of the total support” the government afforded for a nine select agriculture 
commodities.31  Consequently, faced with an increasing guerrilla presence as well as 
economic losses incurred by la aperture, Colombia’s livestock industry appears 
unwilling to commit to any land reform policy as a means of conflict resolution, as they 
believe they alone will disproportionately bear the cost of peace with the guerrillas.   
 
26 “Costo del Conflicto Enero a Junio de 2003.”   Federacion Colombiano de Ganaderos (FEDEGAN) 
Official Website (June 2003) http://www.fedegan.org.co/Costo%20del%20Conflicto.ppt [10 Sep 2003]. 
27 Richani, Nazih.  Systems of Violence: The Political Economy of War and Peace in Colombia. (State 
University of New York Press, 2002), 142. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Richani, 143. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid.   
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In 1997 as part of ongoing peace negotiations between the state and guerrillas, 
FEDEGAN members offered to hand over 10 percent of their land to peasants.32   
Although the paramilitaries supported this initiative, FARC rejected the offer, as they 
were unwilling to concede that land reform was the only precondition for a negotiated 
peace.33   After failed the failed peace process of the Pastrana administration, FEDEGAN 
has shown it is unwillingly to make similar land reform concessions.   In September 
2003, a letter from FEDEGAN to President Uribe expressed their support of a policy of a 
“program of demobilization and reintegration,” in which they vowed to integrate as many 
former guerrillas as possible into the labor force of the cattle industry.34     
While the path of land reform is certainly a difficult political agenda, of equal 
importance is actually implementing land reform policy.  In Colombia the cold hard fact 
is that after 40 years of land reform, Colombia’s land reform agency INCORA was 
unable to significantly change Colombia’s inequality of landownership.   Understanding 
how this happened, despite a huge investment by the state and external actors (i.e. the 
United States), is important if any future land reform is to be effectively implemented.  
INCORA (Instituto Nacional de Colonización y Reforma Agraria), Colombia’s official 
land reform agency, was until this year a prominent actor within Colombia’s land reform 
policy.  Established in 1961, INCORA traditionally focused its efforts in the titling and 
distribution of Colombia’s vast, frontiers.  In this regard, INCORA was able to post 
significant overall results with colonization responsible for 14 million hectares and 
427,000 titles distributed.35   However, in the area of land redistribution, INCORA has 
experienced less than stellar results with only 1.8 million hectares of land transferred.  
While not to discount INCORA’s significant colonization efforts, a large percentage of 
Colombia’s most arable croplands are already in the hands of Colombia’s large 
landowners.    
 
32 Ferrer, Yadira.   “Landowners offer peasant 10 percent of their land.”  Inter Press Service: New 
York, 11 Nov 1997, p. 1.   
33 Ibid. 
34  “Propuesta Ganadera: hacia la reinserción productiva.”  Federacion Colombiano de Ganaderos 
(FEDEGAN) Home page on-line (June 2003).  Available from http://www.fedegan.org.co/todo_notic.html   
(accessed on 10 Sep 2003). 
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What has also plagued INCORA since its inception are poor administration and 
excessive operational costs.   As table 9 illustrates, a large percentage of INCORA’s 
annual budget has gone towards “financing a huge and relatively stable bureaucracy.”36    
In the 1990s this translated to approximately 35 billion pesos or 20 to 30 percent of 
INCORA’s total budget.37   The World Bank notes that although budget cuts from 1999 
to 2000 significantly lowered INCORA’s budget, it did not result in staff reductions.38    
The skewed tendency of high operational costs has reduced the funds available for 
INCORA’s preferred method of transferring land:  the state’s outright purchasing of land 
instead of expropriation.    
In 1994 under Law 160/94, the government attempted to reduce some of the costs 
of land reform to the state by implementing a negotiated land reform, based on cost 
sharing.    Although there were some positive results of the program, overall, land reform 
Source:  Lavadenz, and Klaus Deininger. “Land Policy,” in Marcelo M. Giugale, Olivier Lafourcade, and 
Connie Luff ed.  Colombia: The Economic Foundations of Peace (World Bank, 2003). 
                                                 





                                                
under Law 160 failed to live up to expectations.  One of the tenets of Law 160 was for the 
new landowner to finance 30 percent of the land’s value, requiring private sector and 
market involvement to help finance this cost.  However, the large bureaucracy of 
INCORA had the effect of driving away private sector involvement as many working for 
INCORA viewed “decentralization” as a direct threat to his or her own employment.39     
More recently under Law 160/2001, a majority of land reform recipients, who were 
granted credit for 70 percent of land value, were found to be either in default of their 
loans or to have already abandoned their new lands.40  All of these factors contributed to 
President Uribe’s May 2003 decision, which was also advocated by the World Bank, to 
dissolve INCORA.   Today, Colombia has no dedicated land reform agency; rather it has 
created the National Institute of Rural Development (INCODER), which continues to 
concentrate on land colonization instead of redistribution.41    
D. FARC AND LAND REFORM 
If land reform is to play a role in conflict resolution, one has to assume that   
FARC still has some land reform ideological motivations remaining and have not 
completely converted to narco-terrorism.   Without a doubt FARC, whose ideology is 
based on Marxism and socialism, have since the 1980’s become quite successful 
capitalists.   In 1998 alone, estimates of the guerrilla’s financial strategy of kidnappings, 
extortion, money laundering, coca taxation (gramaje), and other rent seeking created an 
income of $1.5 million a day.42   Of this amount, FARC received almost 60% of its 
income from drug trafficking. 43  Yet the question remains, would land reform provide 
the impetus for FARC to lay down their arms?  Will the lack of a government-enacted 
land reform lead to a repeat of the situation in Vietnam, in which insurgents were able to 
enlarge and solidify their peasant support by carrying out their own land reform in 
occupied lands? 
 
39 Lavadenz and Deininger, 575.    
40 Ibid. 
41 Weinberg, Bill.  “Glyphosate and Paramilitary Terror in Colombia’s Cimitarra Valley.”  (Sept 4, 
2003) www.colombia.indymedia.org  [9/18/2003].   
42 Suarez, Alfredo R.   “Parasites and Predators: Guerrillas and the Insurrection Economy of 
Colombia.”  Journal of International Affairs (Spring 2000, Vol. 53.2), 585. 
43 Ibid.   
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Many characterizations of FARC inevitably point to its “agrarian reform” minded 
political agenda.  Yet while land reform may be an important from a ideological 
perspective for FARC, its role in bringing the guerrillas to the peace table is dubious.  
Recalling its Communist roots from the previous chapter, today FARC basis its ideology 
on what it has termed “Bolivarianism.” One former Samper administration official 
characterized FARC’s “Bolivarianism” as a “gaseous mixture of populism and anti-
imperialism,” directed towards gaining middle-class support.44   In a 2001 interview with 
The Economist, FARC secretary Alfonso Cano stated the organization’s institutional goal 
as:  “Our struggle is to do away with the state as it now exists in Colombia, preferably by 
political means, but if they don’t let us then we have to carry on shooting.”45     Yet even 
more telling about the inner-workings of FARC is one independent intelligence 
assessment: 
While still professing Marxist-Leninist ideology…their political ideas are 
hazy at best, makeshift at worst.  It is likely that this ideology is used 
mainly as a glue to hold the organization together and to indoctrinate new 
recruits, and does not play a significant part in the formation of FARC 
policy.  It would however, be completely inaccurate to portray the group 
as nothing more than a drug cartel…the leaders of the FARC do not live in 
luxury and are not motivated by the desire to amass huge personal fortune.  
For them it is all about power.46   
While land reform is one item on FARC’s agenda, the group is unlikely to forsake 
the rest of their objectives in exchange for this concession at the peace table.   There is 
also strong evidence to support that FARC clearly does not believe that any land reform 
concessions by the government will be honored.    Part of the 1984 “cease fire” 
agreement between the government and FARC specifically stipulated, “The Peace 
Commission gives its assurance that the government has the firm intention to…support 
 
44 “Colombia Survey:  Talk of Peace, Acts of War.”   The Economist (April 21, 2001) Available from 
www.proquest.umi.com  (accessed on 6 Mar  2003). 
45 “Colombia Survey:  Talk of Peace, Acts of War.” The Economist (April 21, 2001) 
www.proquest.umi.com (accessed on 6 Mar 2003). 
46 “Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: Colombia.”  Jane’s (2002) available from 
http://www4.janes.com  (accessed on 13 Feb 2003). 
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vigorously the implementation of an agrarian reform policy.”47   In light of the 
breakdown of the “cease fire” accord and the subsequent dismantlement of the UP Party, 
FARC will be most unwilling to “lay down their arms” over land reform concessions 
without seeing results and commitment by the government and or international 
community.    
An even equally puzzling paradox for FARC is why the guerrilla group has not 
broadened its political capital in the countryside by carrying out land reform in the 
territories they control.  From a political economy vantage, FARC represents two groups 
of Colombia’s peasants: (1) colonos who have colonized the frontier regions of 
Colombia; and (2) the farmers and day laborers of coca cultivation.48   Unlike the Viet 
Cong (National Liberation Front), who implemented a more cost-effective and appealing 
form of peasant land reform than the South Vietnamese government, FARC seems to be 
content surviving as an armed peasant protection organization.   A large part of FARC’s 
inability to politically capitalize on the land reform issue is that as the previous chapter 
showed (Figure 9), the majority of territory where FARC is active is jointly contested by 
paramilitaries.   Clearly, the decision to protect coca cultivation supercedes FARC desires 
to also protect any FARC supported land reform efforts.  Consequently, from available 
evidence it appears that for FARC, land reform’s importance lies not during the conflict 
per se, but after the their final victory over the government.   In May 2000 the FARC 
released the following “decree 001” which presumably is to go into effect following 
“FARC’s assumption of power:”      
1. Free land: The government of the FARC would freely grant land to the 
peasants who work it or who want to work it in accordance with the 
country's geographic regions.  
2. Land confiscation: The guerrilla organization decrees that the properties 
of large landowners will be confiscated and equitably distributed among 
Colombians.  
 
47 Chernick, Marc W.  “Negotiated Settlement to Armed Conflict: Lessons from the Colombian Peace 
Process.”  [Electronic version] Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs, 30.4, (Winter, 1988-
89), 73. 
48 “Colombia Survey:  Talk of Peace, Acts of War.”   The Economist (April 21, 2001) Available from 
www.proquest.umi.com  (accessed on 6 Mar  2003). 
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3. Economic units: The FARC will create the economic unit of the 
countryside, which will be used to work in accordance with the fertility 
and location of the piece of land with a minimum of 20 ha. Roads will be 
built to transport the crops from remote departments.  
4. Writing off debts: The debts of the peasants with the State will be 
written off...[ellipsis as published] and the money earned from the 
production of their land will be reinvested.  
5. Wealthy peasants: The government of the FARC will respect the 
property of the peasants who have worked their land all their lives.  
6. Credit and aid: The FARC will grant payment facilities and supply 
seeds and work tools to peasants. Broad credit systems will be created. A 
scholarship system for technical studies by the children of peasants will be 
created.  
7. Support prices: To maintain stable staple prices, the products of the 
family basket will have basic prices.  
8. Land to the indigenous people: All of the land of the indigenous people 
will be respected and lost and exploited land will be returned to them.  
9. Confiscation of foreigners' property: The land occupied by U.S. 
companies, whatever their activity, will be confiscated.49
 
In conclusion, FARC’s exponential rise as a significant armed threat to the 
Colombian state via its criminal association with the coca industry seems to have 
undermined much of its ideological identity.  While land reform may play a role in 
FARC’s recruitment and propaganda, a government redistributive land reform policy 
would most likely have the effect of undermining what popular support FARC does 
maintain, and in the long-term, provide legitimate crop cultivation.  Without coca and the 
financial capital it represents, FARC would most likely return to obscurity in the 
mountains of Colombia.    
E.  THE PARAMILITARIES AND LAND REFORM       
Recalling the case of El Salvador, one of the reasons land reform failed to make 
any difference in the rural conflict was the fact that paramilitary “death squads,” 
 
49 “Translation of FARC law 001: Land reform and confiscation of foreign property.”   Available from 
http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/war/2000/05/000519-col-osac1.htm  (accessed on 16 Nov 2003). 
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unleashed a reign of terror driving many peasants into the insurgency camp.   In the 
Colombian case any future redistributive land reform policy is likely to experience a 
similar phenomenon unless the state provides rural security for new land recipients.   The 
10,000 strong United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia or AUC (some estimates are as 
high as 14,000) is a consolidation of many paramilitary groups that were previously 
legally permissible as “self-defense” groups.   In the free-market environment of a 
security crisis, the AUC arose to fill a void in the countryside that the state could not 
provide.   Now largely funded by their involvement in narcotrafficking and through other 
financing by “drug barons,” the AUC has been responsible for the worst human rights 
record of any armed actor in the Colombian conflict.    Colombia’s paramilitary groups, 
of which the AUC is the country’s largest, have much to lose in the event redistributive 
land reform occurs.  Like many of the actors who have a “stake” in any subsequent land 
reform policy, the rise of the paramilitary groups, specifically the (AUC), has grown 
exponentially with narco-trafficking.   Not only are the paramilitaries highly involved in 
narco-trafficking, but they have also found land as the perfect instrument to launder drug 
profits.50         
Ideologically the AUC argue they are protecting the state against the guerrillas.  
In reality, they are protecting the interest of landowners, narcotraffickers, and themselves.  
In recent events, President Uribe and AUC leader Carlos Castaño reached a “tentative” 
agreement that would allow the AUC to disarm with the state's guarantee of a “general 
amnesty” for criminal and human rights abuses.51   Whether or not this occurs is still 
being debated not only in Colombia, but also in the United States where Plan Colombia 
aid is strongly tied to protecting human rights, and where top AUC leaders, including 
Castaño are wanted for drug trafficking charges.     Indications that this agreement may 
become more than a “tentative” agreement to disarm is evidenced by the recent seizures 
of farms by the AUC’s rank and file soldiers attempting to secure future employment 
 
50 “Colombia: Negotiating with the paramilitaries.”  International Crisis Group: Latin American 
Report No. 5 (16 Sept 2003), http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2003/icg-col-16sep.pdf [11 Nov 
2003]. 
51 Caballero, Maria Cristina. “Peace at any price: Colombia seems ready to give amnesty to a 
paramilitary ‘monster’ if he’ll lay down his guns.”  Newsweek (International ed.). (New York: Aug 11, 
2003. p. 30), www.proquest.umi.com [28 Aug 2003]. 
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when demobilization comes.52   Further evidence of a demobilization of the AUC comes 
from the November 26, 2003, disarmament of the 800-man strong Medellín based AUC 
faction called Cacique Nutibara.53   Nevertheless, even if the AUC does disarm, there are 
other rogue paramilitary groups in Colombia that would emerge to oppose with violence 
the loss of land imposed by a redistributive land reform.   For the groups that the 
paramilitaries represent, as well as the guerrillas, land is power. 
F. ASSET FORFEITURE: "A WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY?" 
 Up to this point in the chapter, I have shown that any attempt to implement a 
redistributive land reform will be not only extremely difficult for Colombia’s president to 
implement within the current political system, but also will be opposed by interest groups 
and perhaps violently by some of the armed non-state actors.   In light of this, key actors 
in Colombia and the United States have seized on Colombia’s recently passed asset 
forfeiture law as one remaining potential “window of opportunity,” which could have 
significant ramifications on both the “war on drugs” and the rural conflict.  However, 
while asset forfeiture does represent a significant opportunity for breaking down the 
barriers of inequality caused by “reverse land reform,” it is likely to instigate as much or 
more violence as a redistributive land reform policy.   Asset forfeiture is an expropriative 
type of land reform, and as such challenges both political and socio-economic status 
quos.  Although FARC would most likely support asset forfeiture as it attacks their 
primary adversary, it would be highly contested by the narco-bourgeoisie and the 
paramilitaries.   
 Signed into law by President Uribe on December 12, 2002, Law 785 has five 
main provisions:  (1) the state can expropriate those assets that were obtained through 
illegal funds; (2) once these assets are in the custody of the state the can be designated for 
communal purposes (i.e. land reform); (3) citizens reporting “the existence of assets 
obtained illegally or that have been used to commit crimes…receive a reward amounting 
to 5 percent of the commercial value of the asset;”  (4) the length of asset forfeiture 
 
52 Wilson, Scott.  “Cease-Fire Becomes Land Grab; Colombian Group Takes Farmland, Homes at 
Gunpoint.”  The Washington Post  (Sept. 20, 2003, p. A25) www.proquest.umi.com (accessed on 1 Oct 
2003). 
53 Forero, Juan.  “800 in Colombia Lay Down Arms, Kindling Peace Hopes.”  [On-line version] New 
York Times (November 26, 2003,.”  www.nytimes.com (accessed on 3 Dec. 2003).  
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proceedings is reduced from two years to four months; and (5) the National Drug 
Directorate is placed in charge of managing those assets seized.54  In light of the over 
four million hectares worth an estimated $2.4 billion purchased by narco-trafficking 
profits, the potential ramifications of Law 785 are enormous.    
 Shortly after the passage of LAW 785, many in Colombia saw this as the greatest 
route for far-reaching land reform:  
The new law streamlining the process of expropriating illegally acquired 
assets, if applied decisively and equally, would allow for a rapid 
elimination of ownership rights where they never should have existed and 
would put into place a new and quick agrarian reform.55
Yet in the almost year since its inception, Law 785 has proven difficult to implement.   
The Colombian National Drug Directorate (DNE) has found itself in a legal imbroglio as 
it has been overwhelmed with hundreds of legal notices attempting to prevent or delay 
confiscation.  Furthermore, some have been critical of the DNE itself as Julia Swieg 
writes:   
Several million hectares of fertile land, as well as hundreds of millions of 
dollars in other assets, are in the hands of the government, thanks to asset 
forfeiture laws… but Colombia's equivalent of the Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DNE), which is charged with managing and redistributing 
the assets, is beset by patronage and bureaucratic inertia. Land, cattle and 
other assets sit idle or rot away, benefiting neither the state nor, in the case 
of the land, the 2 million internally displaced Colombians who would 
benefit from land reform.56    
However, regardless of the obstacles that asset forfeiture in Colombia must 
overcome, it is much too early to discount the “potential” of Law 785.    Clearly the 
United States strongly supports asset forfeiture as it is specifically addressed under the 
“strengthening of the judiciary” portion of Plan Colombia.   In October 2003, appearing 
before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Assistant Secretary for 
 
54 “Colombia: Uribe Signs New Expropriation Law.”  El Espectador: Bogota (03 Jan 2002)  
55 Camilo, Juan.  “Tierras sin hombres y hombres sin tierra”  El Tiempo: Bogota, (15 Jan 2003)  
56 Sweig, Julia E.  “Elite sit on the sidelines as Colombia struggles.”   Los Angeles Times (10 Aug 
2003), p. M2.   
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International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Robert Charles gave insight to 
more positive indications of asset forfeiture in Colombia:  
We have supported, through your assistance and in cooperation with the 
Criminal Division of the Department of Justice, numerous programs, 
many of which are implemented by the United States Department of 
Justice…to reform the country’s criminal code, to improve money 
laundering and asset forfeiture regimes and to provide for witness 
protection in key cases. Already there has been a 25% increase in money-
laundering prosecutions and a 42% increase in asset forfeiture cases.57  
G. CONCLUSION  
Is land reform “dead” in Colombia?  For land reform advocates in Colombia, the 
departure of INCORA in May 2003 certainly gave the impression that land reform was 
put on the “back burner” of President Uribe’s political agenda.  Yet in reality INCORA’s 
dismissal may have been for more economic reasons than political.  In December 2002, 
the World Bank recommended INCORA be eliminated or “thoroughly” restructured or 
decentralized.58  Nevertheless, even if INCORA still existed as an independent land 
reform agency, the type of redistributive land reform that many advocate for conflict 
resolution was rarely part of INCORA or the state’s overall agenda.    
This chapter also showed that although Law 785 passed in 2003 still represents 
the greatest realistic opportunity for a redistributive land reform in Colombia, it will face 
significant armed opposition.  Additionally, perhaps the greatest difficulty for 
implementing Law 785 will be determining just what lands were bought with narco-
dollars and which are legitimate.  Lastly, land redistributed via asset forfeiture will still 
have to have a land reform infrastructure to support new land recipients, and as the failed 
case of INCORA showed this is a significant challenge.  The next and final chapter 
provides policy recommendations into how and whether these challenges can be 
addressed.           
 
57 U.S. Congress, Senate.  “Challenges for U.S. Policy Toward Colombia: Is Plan Colombia 
Working?” Testimony of Robert B. Charles, Asst. Secretary for International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement Affairs before Committee on Foreign Relations (Washington: D.C., 29 Oct 2003) 
http://www.state.gov/g/inl/rls/rm/25718.htm  
58 Lavadenz and Deininger, 582. 
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    V. CONCLUSION 
We also understand that democracy is a journey, not a destination. Each 
nation here, including the United States, must work to make freedom 
succeed.  Elections are the foundation of democracy, but nations need to 
build on this foundation with other building blocks, such as a strong 
judiciary, freedom to speak and write as you wish, efficient banking and 
social services, quality schools, secure ownership of land, the ability to 
start and own a business.  We must strengthen this architecture of 
democracy for the benefit of all our people. 
 —President George W. Bush, Summit of the Americas (2001)1
 
This thesis has endeavored to answer the pivotal question, “To what effect would 
a redistributed land reform policy have in resolution of Colombia’s rural conflict?   And 
just as importantly, what is the feasibility of implementing such a policy amid conflict?”   
Chapter II of this thesis examined the leading theoretical scholarship on the 
different explanations of what makes peasants revolt or mobilize.   As this chapter 
showed, there is no consensus that any one theory, whether it concentrates on agrarian 
structures, inequality of income, inequality of landownership, or relative deprivation, 
adequately explains the phenomena.   Wickham-Crowley’s theory of peasant support 
provides the best multi-variable approach to incorporating these different approaches into 
a more generalized applicable theory.   However, in regards to land reform and conflict 
resolution, there is a void in the theoretical literature.  Consequently, the two well-known 
cases of land reform implemented amid conflict, South Vietnam and El Salvador, provide 
much of the precedent and raise many of the current doubts as to whether land reform is 
even feasible in Colombia.   Yet as Chapter II demonstrated, these two cases do not 
provide sufficient evidence that redistributive land reform in Colombia will not work. 
In Chapter III, the “heart” of the land reform and conflict nexus was examined.  
This chapter found that as many have argued, there is indeed an enduring and historical 
legacy that forms the basis of much of today’s rural conflict in Colombia.  It also found 
                                                 
1 United States. The White House.   “Remarks by President George W. Bush at Summit of the 
Americas Working Session-Quebec, Canada.”  The White House: Washington, D.C, (21 April 2001) 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/04/20010423-9.html    
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that Colombia’s peasants have largely been excluded from influencing national land 
policy, and the path to such change has been extremely difficult as evidenced by the 
failed case of ANUC in the early 1970s.   Chapter III also found that the unresolved land 
tenure issue greatly intensified in the mid-1990s due to: the phenomena of “reverse-land 
reform;” a decline in the rural economy leading to subsequent increases in both inequality 
of rural income and landownership; and the second “coca boom” that resulted after 
effective counter-drug strategies in neighboring Peru and Bolivia.   Underlying all of 
these factors is the recurring lack of state presence and hence lack of rural security.   
Chapter IV concentrated on the feasibility of land reform taking into account not 
only the existing political institutions but also the policy preferences of FARC and the 
paramilitaries.    This chapter found that for Colombia’s president to initiate support for a 
redistributive land reform policy in the current political system is difficult.  This is not 
only due to Colombia’s political system, which has been long known to be “clientilistic,” 
but also to well-entrenched agriculture interest groups or gremios, of who the national 
Cattle Federation FEDEGAN has the most to lose.   Chapter IV also examined the 
predicted responses of FARC and the paramilitaries to land reform.  It found that a 
redistributed land reform would likely be contested by FARC as it threatens its pivotal 
“coca growing” peasant base of support, which I deemed FARC’s “center of gravity” in 
Chapter III.   However, an “expropriative” land reform policy based on asset forfeiture 
laws would be better received by FARC as it attacks large landholders who present the 
greatest threat to FARC.  Whether this would be enough for FARC to demobilize is yet 
not clear.   Additionally this chapter found that regardless of a redistributive or 
expropriative type of land reform, its implementation would be contested by both the 
paramilitaries and narco-traffickers.  At stake here is not only illicit drug cultivation but 
also a significant base of power in large land purchases.   
Ultimately this thesis found that not only will Colombia's president find it 
extremely difficult to win political support for such a policy, but also as a “stand alone” 
policy, its very implementation will increase conflict not resolve it.   Nevertheless, the 
century old land tenure issue in Colombia is unlikely to resolve itself and doing nothing 
does not bode well for rural Colombia.    
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A. THE FUTURE OF LAND REFORM IN COLOMBIA: FIVE 
APPROACHES 
This section introduces five possible “paths” or approaches that land reform 
policy in Colombia could take in the near future.  The first approach to the land issue is 
"to do nothing" and represents the reaffirming of the status quo in rural Colombia.    The 
second approach, mimic the current U.S. national security strategy for Colombia, which 
places priority on the resolution of the security problem in Colombia before expansion of 
socio-economic development.  The third approach represents a significant policy change 
from the first and second approach incorporating a redistributive land reform policy into 
a larger rural pacification strategy.  The forth approach is a variation of the previous 
approach as it incorporates asset forfeiture into a pacification strategy.   Lastly, the final 
approach looks at the inevitability of land reform in Colombia in light of post-conflict 
requirements.        
1. Maintaining the Status Quo: “The Do Nothing” Approach 
As Chapter III and Chapter IV demonstrated, land tenure policy in Colombia has 
changed little since the end of La Violencia.     Furthermore, the same political actors that 
have traditionally opposed redistributive land reform policy are still deeply entrenched in 
Colombia’s political system.    Additionally, since the “rise and fall” of ANUC during the 
early 1970s, Colombia’s peasants have been unable to politically mobilize on a national 
level to influence a more favorable redistributive land reform policy.  Moreover, the lack 
of funding and reorganization of INCORA, has turned the land reform agency into a 
virtual defunct organization.  For all of these reasons, land reform’s continued absence 
from the agenda of both the Colombia and U.S. government’s agenda is still the most 
likely predicted outcome.    
From President Uribe’s perspective, what may also be driving the absence of land 
reform from his agenda is the realization that initiating any redistributive land reform 
policy will not be politically supported by those who helped get him elected.  Already 
there are indications that any policy initiative that deviates from President Uribe’s “law 
and order” agenda will not succeed.   In October 2003, the Uribe administration suffered 
its first major political defeat when a 14-point political and economic referendum (which 
96 
                                                
did not include land reform) was strongly rejected by voters.2   Additionally, in the wake 
of the referendum’s defeat, four of President Uribe’s key cabinet members resigned.3    
Consequently, redistributive land reform, which represents a much more controversial 
reform than the set of reforms recently rejected, would clearly not find popular support 
amid the current political conditions in Colombia.     
2. Security First, Socio-economic Reforms Second: The “Do a Little” 
Approach 
As discussed in the introduction of this thesis, current U.S.-Colombia foreign 
policy has two purposes: (1) to reduce and eliminate illicit crop cultivation and 
trafficking in Colombia; and (2) to promote democracy and economic growth by 
strengthening Colombia’s political, judicial, and military institutions.    The underlying 
assumption of eradication and interdiction is that it also attacks the narco-terrorist 
primary source of revenue, thus reducing their ability to wage war against the state.   
Clearly U.S. financial support of Plan Colombia reflects a U.S.-Colombia policy that 
holds security as the primary concern in Colombia.   Although Plan Colombia does 
include aid for alternative development programs and for assisting displaced persons, 
over 80 percent of U.S. assistance is “earmarked” for Colombia’s police and military 
forces. 
One strong argument that favors current U.S. policy in Colombia is that without 
first resolving the security issues in the country; socio-economic reforms such as land 
reform are not possible.   This argument strongly supports my proposal that policy 
makers have discounted land reform’s feasibility during conflict based on results in both 
South Vietnam and El Salvador.    Nevertheless, the Bush administration’s 2004 funding 
request for aid to Colombia continue to support a U.S. approach of “security first” in 
Colombia.  Furthermore, in light of the larger U.S. efforts in the reconstruction of Iraq, 
resource intensive socio-economic reforms such as land reform, will find it difficult to 
compete with shrinking resources in Washington.   In summary, the “do a little” approach 
 
2 BBC News. “Colombia’s Uribe in cabinet crisis.”  [On-line version]; available from 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/low/world/americas/3225941.stm; Internet; (accessed 8 Nov. 2003). 
3 Vaicius, Ingrid. “Recent Changes in the Uribe government.”  Center for International Policy: 
Colombia Project [On-line version] available from 
http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/111803uribecabinet.htm; (accessed 1 Nov. 2003). 
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of the United States in Colombia will most likely continue until the foreseeable future 
when the security conditions in Colombia are more conducive to the U.S. to advocate a 
redistributive land reform policy and expand socio-economic development in Colombia.   
3. Land Reform and Rural Pacification:  The “Do a Lot” Approach 
For Colombia, the requirement for a badly needed rural pacification plan may 
come sooner than later.   On July 15, 2003, the government and the AUC signed the  
Santa Fe de Ralito (Córdoba) accord.4   In this accord, both parties agreed to begin a 
process of formal negotiations that stipulated the demobilization of the AUC by the end 
of December 2005, and the government’s pledge to “reinsert the paramilitaries into 
civilian life.”5  If the demobilization of the AUC’s does come to fruition, there is a 
dangerous possibility that without a state military presence, FARC will expand and 
consolidate previously disputed territory making the group even more difficult for the 
state to counter.    Recalling Chapter III, while guerrillas and paramilitaries may control 
40% of the countryside, much of this territory is disputed between the two parties.  
Consequently, Colombia must be prepared to rapidly and aggressively implement a rural 
pacification strategy prior to the AUC’s demobilization to not only deter other 
paramilitary groups from filling in the vacuum of the AUC, but also to prevent FARC 
from capitalizing on those peasant communities that were targets of paramilitary violence 
and hence may be more likely to support the guerrillas vice the state.   
While the very mention of pacification may cause some U.S. policymakers to 
cringe recalling failed pacification efforts in South Vietnam, it is a viable counter-
insurgency strategy in the Colombian case.   Pacification applied to the Colombian case 
would mean Colombia’s military would provide rural security for both government and 
non-government agencies to implement needed socio-economic reforms (i.e., land 
reform), all working towards the common goal of ending the most enduring rural 
insurgency in all of Latin America.    Based on the South Vietnamese case successful 
 
4 International Crisis Group.  “Colombia: Negotiating with the paramilitaries.”  [Electronic version] 
ICG Latin America Report No. 5  (16 Sep., 2003), 22, 
http://www.crisisweb.org/home/getfile.cfm?id=973&type=pdf  
5  Ibid. 
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pacification hinges on the strong commitment of the state to socio-economic reforms, and 
an equally committed military to provide rural security.6     
Already in Colombia there is strong evidence that supports this hypothesis as a 
2002 USAID internal audit of ongoing alternative development programs stated: 
The successful accomplishment of the CAD [Coca alternative 
development] program is hindered by security constraints…includ[ing] 
kidnappings, threats, detainments, thefts, and killings of USAID/Colombia 
partners and recipients.  Because of the imminent dangers in rural areas of 
Colombia, non-Colombian staff cannot perform site visits without massive 
security precautions…In addition, security threats make it more difficult to 
find people willing to work with Chemonics [USAID contractor for CAD] 
because to do so is seen as a danger in and of itself.7
While alternative development is not land reform, they are similar processes, and the 
security issue facing alternative development serves as a good predictor of a similar 
outcome for land reform without security.    Yet while pacification is a viable in 
Colombia, the Colombian president faces much difficulty in getting the military to 
commit to rural security.     
Throughout this thesis there has been a strange absence of the Colombian military 
from the current land and conflict analysis.   This is due in large part to the military’s 
current counter-insurgency strategy of “containment” that has focused on: (1) “keeping 
the guerrillas out of the strategic economic areas and political centers;” and (2) capturing 
or eliminating the guerrilla leadership.8   Consequently, with much of the countryside 
devoid of a state-military presence, the paramilitaries and guerrillas have been fighting a 
“no-holds-barred turf war.”  The unwillingness of the military to engage the guerrillas 
and paramilitaries “head on,” also stems from a restrictive U.S.-Colombia foreign aid 
policy, which although now incorporates counter-terrorism, has continued to make 
counter-narcotics, not counter-insurgency the number one U.S. national security priority 
 
6 See Richard A. Hunt’s, Pacification:  The American Struggle for Vietnam’s Hearts and Minds 
(1995), the best comprehensive scholarship on this important aspect of the Vietnam War. 
7 United States.  Agency for International Development (USAID).  “Audit of the USAID/Colombia-
Financed Coca Alternative Development Program Under the Plan Colombia Supplemental Appropriation, 
No. 1-514-02-005-P).”  [Electronic version] (USAID:  San Salvador, 16 Jan. 2002), 4, 
http://www.usaid.gov/oig/public/fy02rpts/1-514-02-005-p.pdf . 
8 Richani, 42. 
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in Colombia.   U.S. legislators have purposely avoided supporting a U.S.-Colombia 
policy that bears any resemblance to the “quagmire” of South Vietnam or the “human 
rights” nightmare of El Salvador.    While these indications may lead some to conclude 
that it will be difficult for Colombia’s military to commit to rural security, many forget 
that it was this same military that conducted a successful counter-insurgency and civic 
action strategy during the 1960s bringing peace to post-Violencia rural Colombia.9    
 Some may argue that in light of President Uribe’s June 2003 “Democratic 
Defense and Security Policy,” in which 15,000 peasants were recruited in a planned 
20,000 strong peasant self-defense force, that the military is not required in 
pacification.10   Yet as was shown in South Vietnam, relying on a peasant based militia 
force is no substitute for professionally trained full-time military forces.  In the South 
Vietnamese case, similar forces called “Regional and Popular Forces,” who were “lightly 
armed, poorly disciplined, and partially trained,” were routinely overrun by main force 
Viet Cong units.11  Already there are indications that a similar fate could occur to 
Colombia’s peasant militias.12
 Putting aside the difficulty of Colombia’s military to commit to rural security, it 
must also be acknowledged there are certain “trip wires” inherent in the military’s role in 
pacification.  It is well recognized that during counter-insurgency operations 
indiscriminate government terror at the hands of the military most often favors increased 
peasant support for the insurgents (i.e., El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua).13    
Furthermore, as T. David Mason found in the Salvadoran case, any gains made by the 
government in reforms, specifically land reform, evaporate after indiscriminate violence 
 
9 Rempe, 30. 
10 International Crisis Group.  “Colombia: President Uribe’s Democratic Security Policy.”  [Electronic 
version] ICG Latin America Report No. 6 (13 Nov 2003), 4, 
http://www.crisisweb.org//library/documents/latin_america/06_colombia__uribe_dem__security.pdf    See 
also, “Peasants Join Colombian Army.”  BBC News (17 June 2003) [On-line version] 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/2995716.stm .
11 Hunt, 27. In 1969 South Vietnam’s regional/provincial forces numbered 470,000 (Hunt, 275).     
12 International Crisis Group.  “Colombia: President Uribe’s Democratic Security Policy,” 4.   This 
report notes that initially Colombia’s peasants were to “serve and protect” the same geographic area they 
live in.  However, as it was well known in the communities, which peasants were serving in, they became 
easily recognizable for both FARC and the ELN. 
13 Wickham-Crowley, Timothy.  “Terror and Guerrilla Warfare in Latin America, 1956-1970.”  
[Electronic version] Comparative Studies in Society and History, 32.2, (Apr., 1990), 235. 
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by “death squads” and security forces.14    It appears that Colombia’s military is very well 
aware of the “double-edged sword” the broadening of a counter-insurgency strategy 
represents as one “think tank” recently reported:  
The security forces appear to be divided between “hawks” or “hardliners”, 
who are fully behind the president [Uribe] and seek quick and spectacular 
military results, and “soft-liners” or “traditionalist”, who are less 
aggressive and more conscious of the legal and strategic limits on the 
military.15
Yet it is exactly this healthy “checking force” represented by “soft liners” that what will 
be required to implement a balanced pacification strategy.  Furthermore, much of the 
international community (i.e., Europe) that distanced itself from Plan Colombia’s heavy 
reliance on military force may be more receptive to supporting a balanced pacification 
strategy that utilizes the military for security to implement land reform and other socio-
economic programs.  Pacification represents a viable policy option for Colombia to close 
the “gap” that currently exists between Colombia and the international community.     
4. Merging Asset Forfeiture with Pacification:  Variation on a Theme 
Approach 
Recalling Chapter IV, although expropriative land reform via asset forfeiture 
represents the most viable opportunity for providing sufficient land reform to Colombians 
and would likely be supported by FARC, it would be violently opposed by narco-
trafficker landowners.16  However, Marc Chernick notes in Comparative Peace 
Processes in Latin America (1999), one possible solution for working past this significant 
impasse: 
Would the traffickers willingly give up such vast extensions of land 
without mounting resistance, even violent resistance?  An argument can be 
 
14 Mason, 227.   
15 International Crisis Group.  “Colombia: President Uribe’s Democratic Security Policy,” 10. 
16 Ramon Lopez and Alberto Valdes found that to bring “the poorest 40 percent of [Colombia’s] farm 
households above the poverty line would require very large transfers of land, unless accompanied by other 
policy instrument to increase income,” thus confirming the requirement of large land expropriations by 
asset forfeiture.  Lopez, Ramon, and Alberto Valdes.  “Determinants of Rural Poverty in Colombia.” In 
Ramon Lopez and Alberto Valdez, eds., Rural Poverty in Latin America.  (St. Martin’s Press: New York, 
2000) cited in Colombia: The Economic Foundation of Peace (2003), 491. 
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made that they would be willing to surrender such land peacefully in the 
context of a defined path that leads to their incorporation into society.17   
The critical assumption of this argument is that Colombia’s judicial system can not only 
identify those land purchased through narco-trafficking, but also enforce asset forfeiture 
laws and prosecute accordingly, essentially “plea bargaining” these cases.  However, as 
was shown with similar negotiations with the Medellín drug cartel, most notably drug 
lord Pablo Escobar, making concessions to narco-traffickers can significantly undermine 
the legitimacy of the judiciary.    
A more legitimate option that would find more support within the United States 
and international community is for the Colombian government to outright expropriate 
proven narco-landholdings, and redistribute the land as part of a larger pacification 
strategy covered in the previous scenario.  Again this option is to not only help strengthen 
Colombia’s judiciary and “rule of law,” but would also be more favorable in finding 
financial support abroad.   As Chapter IV illustrated, successful land reform requires an 
associated infrastructure that is very resource intensive.   Yet if done correctly can 
support agricultural production that is viable in the global markets.   The leading 
drawback to this approach is that its implementation could significantly worsen 
conditions before they get better as it would be highly contested by narco-traffickers and 
the paramilitaries.   
5. “Pay Me Now or Pay Me Later,” Post-Conflict Land Reform 
Requirements in Colombia 
Within the past decade it has become increasingly clear that resolution of land 
issues play a significant role in post-conflict recovery.   Based on post-conflict cases in 
Cambodia, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, and Uganda, Klaus Deininger found 
resolution of pre-existing land tenure issues is essential for providing a “livelihood for 
demobilized combatants and displaced populations.”18   In the Nicaraguan case, within 
less than a year of the 1991 peace accords, an estimated 22,835 troops (both former-
contras and former Sandinista soldiers) had remobilized as many had returned home to 
 
17 Chernick,  Marc.   “Negotiating Peace amid Multiple Forms of Violence:  The Protracted Search for 
a Settlement to the Armed Conflicts in Colombia,” in Comparative Peace Processes in Latin America, ed. 
Cynthia J. Arnson.  (Woodrow Wilson Center Press: Washington, D.C., 1999), 196.    
18 Deininger, Land Policies, 159. 
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find no “land, resources, or training.”19  Consequently, the continuing unresolved land 
issues in post-conflict Nicaragua greatly affected its economic recovery well into the late 
1990s.20     
Certainly in the Colombian case where there is an estimated 30,000 guerrilla and 
paramilitary combatants, and an estimated 2.5 million internally displaced people (IDP), 
of whom over half previously held titles to land, the conditions are ripe for a similar 
situation when a peace settlement does come.21    The reality of post-conflict 
requirements is that land and conflict in Colombia are inevitably bound to one another, 
and their resolution forms a critical part of a lasting peace.   As this thesis has shown, 
coming to terms with this paradox is a difficult proposition for Colombia, as land is 
power in Colombia, and Colombians have shown that land itself is worth killing and 
dying for.    
B.  FINAL THOUGHTS 
It has not been the purpose of this thesis to question the morality of a 
redistributive land reform policy in Colombia.   Rather it attempted to look deeper at 
what many hold as one possible solution to the Colombian conflict.   It is ironic that land 
reform, once a pillar of U.S. foreign policy, has all but disappeared from the American 
vocabulary.   In the aftermath of the Cold War the very mention of land reform 
immediately brings forth a negative reaction in what Prosterman and Hanstad phrased 
“being what the bad elements want.”22   Yet perhaps we in the United States have 
forgotten much of our own history of land reform (i.e., the Homestead Act) during the 
late 19th and early 20th century that had long-lasting and profound effects in shaping the 
“American Experience.”     As the United States emerges into the uncertainty of the 21st 
century, “democracy and freedom” have returned to become the driving forces of U.S. 
 
19 Spalding, Rose J. “From low-intensity war to low-intensity peace: The Nicaraguan peace process,” 
43. In Comparative Peace Processes in Latin America, ed. Cynthia J. Arnson.  Woodrow  Wilson Center 
Press: Washington, D.C., 1999. 
 
20 Deininger, Land Policies, 160. 
21 Arboleda, Jairo and Elena Correa.  “Forced Internal Displacement,”  in Giugale, Marcelo M., 
Olivier Lafourcade, and Connie Luff editors. Colombia the  Economic Foundation of Peace, World Bank: 
New York, 2003. 
 
22 Prosterman and Hanstad, 8.   
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foreign policy.     Consequently, as President George W. Bush indicated in his opening 
remarks at the Summit of the Americas (2001), the right to secure landownership remains 
a building block of democracy.    As U.S. policymakers continue to shape an evolving 
U.S.-Colombia foreign policy, the United States as well as Colombia must come to terms 
with the relationship between landownership and democratization.   Recalling the words 
of Thomas Jefferson, himself a large landowner:  
Whenever there is in any country uncultivated lands and unemployed 
poor, it is clear that the laws of property have been so far extended as to 
violate natural right… It is not too soon to provide by every possible 
means that as few as possible shall be without a little portion of land. The 





23 Jefferson, Thomas.  “The Writings of Thomas Jefferson: Papers 8:682.” [On-line version] in 
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